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I. INTRODUCTION
Some thirteen years have passed since Congress created the
concept of "enterprise coverage," a concept unique to social legisla-
tion. With the appearance of two recent Supreme Court decisions'
and the passage of the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of
19742 most of the crucial coverage issues arising under the Fair
Labor Standards Act 3 have now been resolved. It is appropriate
therefore to review the coverage provisions of this unique and com-
plicated statute, with particular emphasis upon the aspects of "en-
terprise coverage."
Enacted during the great depression and occasionally charac-
terized as the original "anti-poverty" statute, 4 the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act of 1938 was designed to provide a floor under wages,
secure premium compensation for overtime, and regulate child
labor. Its minimum wage provisions have tended to lag behind infla-
tion, making them relevant only to the lowest paid strata of the
1. Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512 (1973); Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S.
190 (1973).
2. Pub. L. No. 93-259 (April 8, 1974). These amendments made vast changes in the Act.
Inter alia, they increased minimum wages, extended coverage to most state and federal
employees and domestic workers, reduced the maximum dollar volume for retail exemptions,
amended age discrimination coverage, and altered numerous overtime exemptions. As the
amendments relate to this article, a minor but important amendment to enterprise coverage
was made in § 6(a)(5)(A), in which § 3(s) of the existing Act was amended by striking
"including employees handling, selling or otherwise working on goods" and substituting "or
employees handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials." The net result is
that "or" replaced "including" and "materials" was added following "goods."
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. (1970).
4. Donahue, Underpinning the Proverty Program-The Wage & Hour Act Three De-
cades Later, N.Y.U. TWENTIETH ANN. CONF. ON LABOR, 59, 59-61 (1968); Willis, The Evolution
of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 26 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 607 (1972); S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong.
2d Sess. (1966).
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nation's workforce.' The overtime provisions of the Act, however,
require one and one half the "regular rate" of pay, not merely time
and a half of the minimum rate,' and thus the Act can impose
substantial overtime liability upon an unwary employer paying sub-
stantial wages. Furthermore, since the Equal Pay Act of 1963 dove-
tails into the coverage and enforcement provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act, regulation of wage discrimination based upon sex
depends substantially upon the coverage provisions of the latter
statute.
7
In establishing the scope of coverage of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act, Congress refrained from legislating to the full extent of
its constitutional power to regulate commerce. 8 Rather than subject-
ing all employers "affecting commerce" to the Act,9 or establishing
a minimum number of employees necessary for statutory coverage, 0
Congress set forth a concept more limited than "affecting com-
merce" and more expansive in some ways than the minimum em-
ployee statutes. The resulting coverage provisions of the Act are
5. As of May 1974 the minimum wage was increased from $1.60 to $2.00 per hour. This
will be increased to $2.10 January 1, 1975 and to $2.30 as of January 7, 1976. Since § 26 of
the 1974 amendments authorizes the Secretary to recover back wages and an equal amount
in liquidated damages, however, potential liability can be substantial.
6. Section 7(a) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1970) establishes a maximum work week
of 40 hours and requires payment to covered employees of one and one half times "the regular
rate." The purpose of the overtime provision was to make overtime compensation sufficently
expensive so that employers would be induced to hire additional employees rather than to
work the same employees more than the maximum hours. S. REP. No. 2182, 75th Cong. 3d
Sess. (1938). This was a compromise to an original proposal to outlaw working employees
overtime completely. See S. 2475 as introduced May 24, 1937, 75 Cong. 1st Sess.
7. Section 6(d) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). The Equal Pay Act of 1963 (77
Stat. 56) was inserted as an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act. In short, the Equal
Pay Act prohibits discrimination in pay on the basis of the employee's sex. There is substan-
tial duplication between the Equal Pay Act and the provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
(42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970)) which prohibits all forms of employment discrimination based
on sex. Since the coverage provisions of the 2 Acts are different, however, there will be
employers regulated by the Equal Pay Act that are not affected by the Civil Rights Act.
Although the Civil Rights Act purports to cover any industry affecting commerce, the Act
defines a covered employer as one who has fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-
1(b) (1970). Since the Equal Pay Act is an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the
coverage and enforcement provisions of the later Act are applicable to the substantive Equal
Pay provisions. For reasons to be discussed, an employer with 2 employees, one male and one
female, could violate the Equal Pay Act. The Age Discrimination Act (29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34
(1970)) is also enforced by the Secretary of Labor but coverage under that Act is not based
on the Fair Labor Standards Act coverage but instead upon number of employees (20).
8. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522-23 (1942).
9. The 1974 amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-259 (April 8, 1974), declare that domestic
employees "affect commerce" and it is on this basis, rather than on any concept of traditional
or enterprise coverage, that the Act applies to these employees. See also, Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosures Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 402(e), (i), Ci) (1970).
10. See Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1970), and Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
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complex, not easily subject to definition, and consequently a con-
stant source of litigation.
Prior to 1961 coverage was established solely by reference to the
work being performed by the employee, and not by the size or im-
pact of the employer on commerce. Under this "traditional" or
"individual" basis for coverage, an employee was covered by the Act
if he was "engaged in commerce" or in the "production of goods for
commerce," deceptively simple phrases that are in reality complex
terms of art with a thick crust of legislative and judicial gloss.
In 1961 Congress added a new basis for coverage under the Act,
extending it to employees who are not personally "engaged in com-
merce" or in the "production of goods" therefor but who are em-
ployed by an "enterprise engaged in commerce." In defining "enter-
prise engaged in commerce" Congress again elected not to utilize
the term "affecting commerce" or to rely upon the number of em-
ployees at work, but continued to depend largely upon contact with
commerce by individual employees. An enterprise would be "en-
gaged in commerce" if it made sales of a particular volume, or was
part of a particular industry specifically mentioned in the Act, and
if the enterprise had individualized employees engaged in commerce
or in the production of goods for commerce, "including employees
handling, selling, or otherwise working on goods that have been
moved in or produced for commerce. .. .""
With the introduction of the enterprise concept, individual cov-
erage per se no longer plays its once dominant role. Nonetheless, for
many reasons it remains important to understand concepts of indi-
vidual coverage. First, the 1961 and 1966 enterprise amendments
did not eliminate traditional coverage. Regardless whether an em-
ployer is an "enterprise engaged in commerce," an employee can
still claim the benefits of the Act if he establishes that he was
personally "engaged in commerce" or that he produced goods for
commerce. Secondly, coverage of all the employees of an employer
under the enterprise concept may depend upon two or more employ-
ees being traditionally covered, keying the newer enterprise cover-
age in large part to the innumerable traditional coverage decisions
11. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970). Since February 1, 1969 the specified "sales made or
business done" is $250,000 per year. The specific industries that can be covered regardless of
size are: (a) laundering, cleaning or repairing of clothing or fabrics; (b) construction or
reconstruction; and (c) hospitals, nursing homes, schools and colleges. In order to be an
"enterprise engaged in commerce" however, all of the above must also have "employees
engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce, or employees handling,
selling, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been moved in or produced for
commerce . . ." The 1974 amendments substituted "or" for "including" and added "or
materials" after "goods," see note 2, supra.
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of the past thirty-five years. The amendments' addition of the
phrase "handling goods or materials that have been moved in com-
merce" to traditional coverage created a third but distinct basis for
finding the necessary employee contact with commerce, but without
supplanting analysis of the terms "engaged in commerce" or "pro-
duction of goods for commerce." Thus, in order to understand thor-
oughly Congress's reasons for introducing this new third basis of
employee contact, it is first important to appreciate the limitations
of the traditional basis for coverage.' 2
II. TRADITIONAL INDIVIDUAL COVERAGE
A. Engaged in Commerce
Although in enacting the Fair Labor Standards Act Congress
stopped short of regulating all who affected commerce, the Supreme
Court has noted that they did intend "to extend federal control...
throughout the farthest reaches of the channels of commerce."'
Congress did, however, reserve to the states "purely local" areas of
commerce." Mapping the area between the "farthest reaches of
commerce" and areas "purely local" was an activity Justice Frank-
furter characterized as being "as rewarding as an attempt to square
the circle.' 5 "Engaged in commerce" has been said not to be a legal
phrase, but a practical one; in construing it, courts should be
12. The statutory scheme provides for 2 classes of exemptions to employers even when
employees are covered by the Act. The first exempts totally the employees covered thereby
from any coverage under the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a) (1970). Briefly stated, the three major
total exemptions are as follows: First, executive, administrative, and professional employee
exemption. See Walling v. General Industries Co., 330 U.S. 545 (1947); O'Mera-Sterling v.
Goldberg, 299 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1962); Craig v. Far West Eng'r Co., 265 F.2d 251 (9th Cir.
1959). This exemption is no longer applicable to the Equal Pay provisions of the Act. Pub.
L. No. 92-318 (1972). Secondly, employees of retail or service establishments with sales less
than $250,000 per annum are exempt. (Section 8 of the 1974 amendments, however, reduces
that maximum dollar amount in stages so that by January, 1977 the exemption will be
eliminated.) Section 13(a)(2) of theAct defines in detail "retail and service establishment."
See Kentucky Fin. Co. v. Mitchell, 359 U.S. 290 (1966); Idaho Sheet Metal Works, Inc. v.
Wirtz, 383 U.S. 190 (1966); Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388 (1960); Mitchell v.
Bekins Van & Storage Co., 352 U.S. 1027 (1957) (per curiam); Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324
U.S. 490 (1945). Thirdly, certain well defined agricultural employees are not covered. See
Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949). There are numerous
other lesser exemptions.
The second exemption removes the protections of the overtime provisions of the Act for
covered employees. Briefly stated, the major classes with overtime exemptions are as follows:
(a) certain defined agricultural employees, 29 U.S.C. §§ 213(b)(12)-(16) (1970); (b) hotel and
restaurant employees, 29 U.S.C. § 213(b)(8) (1970); and (c) employees of carriers, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 213(b)(1)-(3),(6)-(7) (1970).
13. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 567 (1943).
14. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 520-21 (1942).
15. Id. at 520.
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"guided by practical considerations."' 6 Except for those rather use-
less generalities and some passing references to a similar phrase in
the Federal Employers Liability Act,'" the Supreme Court has pro-
vided no guidelines or uniformly applicable system of analysis for
determining whether a particular activity is "purely local" or
whether it is still within the "farthest reaches of commerce." With
such vague criteria, analysis and accurate prediction of results are
difficult at best.
1. Actual Movement-Employees such as truckdrivers and
railroad engineers are engaged so directly and obviously in the ac-
tual movement of commerce that little question exists as to the
applicability of the Act. Likewise, telephone, telegraph, television,
and radio communications workers fall within the Act's broad defi-
nition of "commerce," which includes "transportation, transmis-
sion, or communication among the several states. . . ."' Even
purely "local" activity that begins or ends the interstate movement
will be considered engaged in commerce. Elevator operators carry-
ing packages and mail on the last leg of their journey are said to be
directly engaged in commerce,' 9 as are secretaries who start the
journey by preparing and mailing financial reports."0
While the term "engaged in commerce" has been judicially
interpreted to include those activities "so closely related to inter-
state transportation as to be in practice and legal relation as part
thereof,"2' it does not include more "indirect assistance" to inter-
state commerce.22 Because the area between "a part thereof' and
"indirect assistance" is a shaded spectrum with no clear bounda-
ries, one is left with "practical considerations" as his guide.
Mechanics working upon and repairing vehicles of interstate
16. Overstreet v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125, 128 (1943). Walling v. Jacksonville
Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564, 570 (1943).
17. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1970).
18. Section 3(b) of theAct, 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1970), defines "commerce" as "trade,
commerce, transportation, transmission, or communication among the several States or be-
tween any State and any place outside thereof." See 29 C.F.R. § 776.10 (1973).
19. Brennan v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1973).
20. Durkin v. Joyce Agency, 110 F. Supp. 918 (N.D. Ill. 1953), aff'd 348 U.S. 945 (1954);
Allen v. Atlantic Realty Co., 384 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967). Some courts had attempted to limit
"engaged in commerce" coverage by distinguishing between "external" and "internal" com-
munications, the latter not being considered "commerce". See Stevens v. Welcome Wagon,
Inc., 390 F.2d 75 (3d Cir. 1968); Billeaudeau v.Temple Assoc., Inc., 213 F.2d 707 (5th Cir.
1954). Recently this distinction has been rejected by the Fifth Circuit, which held that
secretaries who prepared three reports that were mailed monthly to two out-of-state officers
of the corporation were "engaging in commerce". Hodgson v. Travis Edwards, Inc., 465 F.2d
1050 (5th Cir. 1972); accord, Beneficial Fin. Co. v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1965).
21. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 495 (1943).
22. Id. at 497.
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transportation, pipelines, powerlines, and communication facili-
ties2 3 as well as those furnishing the fuel and power24 for their move-
ment have been held to be sufficiently related to commerce to be a
part thereof, as have dispatchers, signalmen, loaders, and ticket
salesmen.25 Even those who provide promotional material, blank
tickets and schedules to a travel agency that represents a steamship
line have been held to have a sufficient nexus to establish "in com-
merce" coverage. 21 District of Columbia parking lot employees han-
dling the cars of interstate tourists and interstate commuters aid
that interstate travel so substantially that they are a part of com-
merce. Similar rationales have been used to justify coverage of
parking lot attendants at interstate airports28 and porters, janitors,
and maintenance men working in and about transportation termin-
als.29 On the other hand, the Supreme Court has held that an inde-
pendent contractor who prepares food for workers repairing railroad
tracks, even though he serves it on the work site, provides only an
indirect assistance to interstate commerce."
Although relatively few cases have failed to find coverage in this
area, two key elements seem to emerge in distinguishing between
"indirect assistance" and "closely related": first, the economic in-
dependence of the business from the flow of interstate commerce;
and secondly, the degree to which interstate commerce would con-
tinue unimpeded without the employee activity.3 1 Virtually all of
the employee activity discussed above is either economically inter-
twined with the interstate activity, or interstate movement would
23. Morris v. McComb, 332 U.S. 422 (1947); Boutell v. Walling, 327 U.S. 463 (1946);
Wirtz v. B.B. Saxon Co., 365 F.2d 457 (6th Cir. 1966); Slover v. Wathen, 140 F.2d 258 (4th
Cir. 1944); 29 C.F.R. § 776.11(b) (1973).
24. Lewis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 154 F,2d 751 (5th Cir. 1946); New Mexico Pub.
Serv. Co. v. Engel, 145 F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 1944); Brennan v. Ventimiglia, 20 Wage & Hour
Cas. 1275 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Hodgson v. Pipeline Oil Co., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 1225 (W.D.
Ky. 1972).
25. See Mitchell v. Railway Express Agency, 160 F. Supp. 628 (D. Me. 1958); Walling
v. Southwestern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 65 F. Supp. 52 (W.D. Mo. 1946). See also 29 C.F.R.
§ 776.10.11 (1973).
26. Caserta v. Home Lines Agency, Inc., 273 F.2d 943 (2d Cir. 1959).
27. Brennan v. S&M Enterprises, 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 165 (D.D.C. 1973).
28. Brennan v. Air Terminal Parking, Inc., 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 475 (D.S.C. 1973);
Hodgson v. Continental Parking Corp., 19 Wage & Hour Cas. 876 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Jackson
v. Airways Parking Co., 297 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
29. Williams v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 315 U.S. 386 (1942); Hargis v. Wabash R.R.,
163 F.2d 608 (7th Cir. 1947); Mornford v. Andrews, 151 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1945); Walling v.
Atlantic Greyhound Corp., 61 F. Supp. 992 (E.D.S.C. 1945); cf. Skidmore v. John J. Casale,
Inc., 160 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1947) (custodian at garage servicing both intrastate and interstate
trucks held to have only an indirect connection with commerce).
30. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491, 495 (1943).
31. Jackson v. Airways Parking Co., 297 F. Supp. 1366 (N.D. Ga. 1969).
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eventually come to a halt were it not for the employee work in
question. Transportation must have power to move. Passengers and
shippers must have schedules, tickets, and bills of lading. Without
parking facilities at transportation terminals, interstate travel as we
know it would cease. Even though it is obvious that workers must
have food, there are many methods for securing it without a catering
service, and given the alternative sources, the furnishing of food to
workers is not so economically intertwined with the transportation
itself, nor so indispensible to the movement of the commerce, that
it has a direct impact thereon. These two factors are no more than
rules of thumb. While not infallible, they perhaps provide guide-
lines a bit more helpful than "practical considerations."
2. Interstate Instrumentalities-In addition to direct partici-
pation in the stream of commerce, the term "engaged in commerce"
also encompasses work on the instrumentalities over which com-
merce flows. Operation and maintenance of a private toll road en-
tirely within a single state has been held to be "engaged in com-
merce" because of the movement of interstate travel over the rpad 1-
Likewise, employees who repair bridges and tracks of a railroad
carrying interstate traffic,3 3 or who repair and maintain television
relay and broadcast apparatus are covered under the Act.34 Simi-
larly, personnel who operate, maintain or repair vehicles at an inter-
state transportation facility (airbase) are deemed to be sufficiently
related to an instrumentality of commerce so as to be a part of
commerce.
3 5
Analogizing to the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 6 the
courts at one time held that one was not "engaged in commerce" if
he was involved in the "new construction" of an instrumentality
that had not previously been dedicated to commerce. In Mitchell
v. C. W. Vollmer & Co.,18 however, the Supreme Court virtually
eliminated this exception by holding that those who worked on the
construction of a new lock in the intracoastal waterway were en-
gaged in commerce. The majority indicated that even if the "new
construction" exception were viable, it was not applicable where the
construction was directly related to the functioning of a total system
32. Overstreed v. North Shore Corp., 318 U.S. 125 (1943).
33. Pedersen v. J.F. Fitzgerald Constr. Co., 318 U.S. 740 (1943).
34. Mitchell v. Rennekamp, 251 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1958); Wirtz v. Indiana Cablevision,
Inc., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 121 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
35. Wirtz v. B.B. Saxon Co., 365 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1966).
36. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51 et seq. (1970).
37. Murphey v. Reed, 168 F.2d 257, rev'd, 335 U.S. 865 (1948) (per curiam). See 39 GEO.
L. J. 156 (1950); 14 VAND. L. Rav. 414 (1960).
38. 349 U.S. 427 (1955).
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already in operation. The interstate waterway system in Mitchell
was already in operation and could not continue to function without
the new lock, and therefore those who worked on the construction
were engaged in commerce. Mitchell was followed and expanded
upon by a Fifth Circuit decision holding that those engaged in the
construction of the Lake Pontchartrain Causeway, a new project
entirely within the state of Louisiana, were "engaged in commerce,"
because the causeway would be a link in the nation's interstate
highway system.39 Any remnant of the "new construction" doctrine
was eliminated by the First Circuit in Compania De Ingenieros y
Contratistas, Inc. v. Goldberg,4 in which employees were construct-
ing a secondary road within the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Obviously neither this road, nor any road in Puerto Rico could be
part of an interstate transportation system. Nonetheless, the court
reasoned that agricultural products would move over this secondary
road under construction to the major road, and on to the port to be
shipped out of the Commonwealth. Thus, those employees working
on the road were so closely related to commerce as to be "a part
thereof." If ever it lived, the doctrine of "new construction" is
dead.4
Besides extending coverage to field employees actually working
on new or existing interstate facilities, the courts have found a nexus
between commerce and employees providing goods or services with
respect to those facilities but never actually engaging in their actual
construction, reconstruction, or repair. In Mitchell v. Lublin,
McGaughy & Associates,2 the Supreme Court considered coverage
of draftsmen, fieldmen and engineers employed by a firm preparing
plans and specifications for repair and construction of such inter-
state instrumentalities as roads, bus terminals, military bases, and
radio and television installations. These employees were considered
"engaged in commerce" because without their services in planning
and directing the construction, the construction could not possibly
take place. Furthermore, the Court held that clerical help providing
support to the employees more directly involved were likewise so
closely related to commerce as to be considered engaged therein.
If the furnishing of plans and specifications is sufficient connec-
tion with commerce to be considered commerce, one would think
that employees handling or furnishing materials used in the repair
and construction of interstate facilities would similarly have the
39. Archer v. Brown & Root, Inc., 241 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1957).
40. 289 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1961); cf. Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S.
207, 213 (1959).
41. See Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310, 313 (1960).
42. 358 U.S. 207 (1959).
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requisite connection to be a part of commerce.4 3 However, in estab-
lishing coverage for such employees the Supreme Court did not
directly address the issue of whether they were "engaged in com-
merce," but rather held that they were engaged in the production
of goods for commerce, thus establishing coverage on the second of
the two bases for traditional coverage." Rejecting a narrow con-
struction of the term "for commerce" as limited solely to interstate
transportation of the goods themselves, the Court concluded that
goods produced for an instrumentality of commerce were produced
"for commerce" even though they never left the jurisdiction.
As the Supreme Court indicated in McLeod v. Threlkeld,"1
where providing meals to those repairing rail lines was considered
too remote from interstate commerce to constitute a part thereof,
employees who have an impact on the furnishing of materials used
in construction can be too far removed for coverage. In Mitchell v.
H.B. Zachry Co.," the employees in question were engaged in the
construction of a reservoir intended to furnish forty per cent of its
water to manufacturers of goods that would move in interstate com-
merce. It is clear that supplying an "ingredient" of goods "for com-
merce" is sufficiently connected with commerce to establish cover-
age.47 In this case, however, the employees were only building a
structure that would supply an ingredient to produce goods that
would move in commerce. The Court held that this activity was too
far removed from commerce to be classified as anything other than
"local." Similarly, a court recently considered a case wherein a
private employer under contract with the state of North Carolina
sold auto license tags to the motoring public. The license fees were
turned over to the state for use in building and repairing state high-
ways. It was argued unsuccessfully that collecting money used in
part to finance roads over which interstate commerce would move
was closely related to commerce and became a part thereof." Like
McLeod and Zachry this was one step too far removed."
43. See Wirtz v. DeQueen Ready Mix Concrete, Inc., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 759 (W.D.
Ark. 1969); Wirtz v. Empire, Inc., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 658 (E.D. Va. 1968).
44. Alstate Constr. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13 (1953); Thomas v. Hempt, 345 U.S. 19
(1953). See also Mitchell v. Emala & Assoc., 274 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1960).
45. McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U.S. 491 (1943).
46. 362 U.S. 310 (1960).
47. Wirtz v. F.M. Sloan, Inc., 411 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1969) (local sale of natural gas,
eventually sold to manufacturers of goods); Mitchell v. Jaffe, 261 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958)
(junk used in making steel); Mitchell v. Mercer Water Co., 208 F.2d 900 (3d Cir. 1953)
(utilities to manufacturer of goods). Section 3(i) of the Fair Labor Standards Act defines
"goods" to include "any part or ingredient thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 203(i). Thus, most of these
cases are analyzed under whether the employees are performing a service "closely related or
directly essential" to the "production of goods for commerce."
48. Hodgson v. Hyatt R-alty Inv. Co., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 1191 (M.D.N.C. 1973).
49. A distinction can perhaps be drawn between construction of a facility that will
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Although one could argue that the channels of interstate com-
merce would eventually close were it not for the persons collecting
the money for the financing of the construction, or building the
plants that produce an ingredient that will go into the materials
that build interstate facilities, the application of a "but for" rule
without modification obviously results in an analysis of "com-
merce" indistinguishable from the doctrine of "affecting com-
merce." Some notion of proximate relationship, vague though it is,
must be injected to stop the analysis short of Congress's ultimate
power, which it did not exercise when legislating in this area.
3. Maintenance of a Free Flow of Commerce.-Channels of
commerce cannot be used indefinitely if obstructions are allowed to
remain in them. Thus, employees who remove logs and other refuse
from navigable rivers are "engaged in commerce,"5 as are wrecker
employees who remove stalled and wrecked automobiles from the
highways, even though they never cross state lines and their high-
way business is minimal. 1 Similarly, assuming that interstate com-
merce cannot proceed when dead and injured persons are upon the
highways, ambulance services that remove these obstructions, as
well as the employees who receive and relay the calls to the drivers, 2
are considered a part of commerce. 3
4. Personally Traveling in Commerce.-An employee is not
engaged in commerce for purposes of coverage under the Act simply
because for his own convenience he elects to commute across state
lines, or because he makes an initial move in commerce in order to
accept employment.54 Even if his job occasionally requires an inter-
state business trip it is probably not enough to make the work "en-
gaging in commerce." 5 If the employment consists of carrying goods
or materials interstate, or if the nature of the business requires
regular and recurring interstate travel the employee will clearly be
provide but an "ingredient" of a good that will be shipped in commerce-Zachry-and the
construction of a facility that will produce the good actually used "in commerce." Archer v.
Brown & Root, Inc., 241 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1957), indicated that construction of a plant that
would manufacture pre-stressed concrete slabs that would be used in the construction of a
bridge was closely related and directly essential to the production of goods for commerce. See
also Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co., 156 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1946); Wirtz v. Tessier Sheet
Metal Works, Inc., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 5 (D.S.D. 1967).
50. Tobin v. Pennington-Winter Constr. Co., 198 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1952).
51. Gray v. Swanney-McDonald, Inc., 436 F.2d 652 (9th Cir. 1971); Crook v. Bryant,
265 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1959); Brennan v. Parnham, 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 497 (W.D. Pa. 1973);
Wirtz v. Robinson & Stephens, Inc., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 765 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
52. Crook v. Bryant, 265 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1959); Hodgson v. Greenfield Auto Service,
20 Wage & Hour Cas. 65 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
53. Wirtz v. A-1 Ambulance Serv., Inc., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 836 (E.D. Ark. 1969);
Duffy v. Oele, 274 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Mich. 1967).
54. 29 C.F.R. § 776.12 (1973).
55. Id.
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considered to be engaging in commerce. Comparative shoppers,
buying service employees, circus performers, and musicians fall
under the latter basis of coverage."
5. Handling of Goods Within the Channels of Commerce.-As
noted earlier, even when transportation is entirely intrastate, the
first and the last link in an interstate journey of goods,57 people,"8
communications 9 or information" is still "commerce." So long as
goods are actually moving in an interstate journey those who handle
them, enabling them to continue their journey are "engaged in com-
merce." At some point, however, the goods will no longer be in-
volved in any journey but will have come to rest, and those who
handle them consequently are not "engaged in commerce." One of
the earliest, and clearly the most important case, involving this
phase of coverage is Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co.6" The
defendant-employer, a wholesale paper distributor, received goods
at a Jacksonville warehouse. Of the three classifications of employ-
ees handling these goods, two were clearly covered. The first group,
drivers who brought the goods across state lines to the warehouse,
were "engaged in commerce" because they were the final link of the
interstate chain. Drivers and handlers of goods taken from the
warehouse and destined for delivery outside Florida, were involved
in the first leg of an interstate journey, and were also "engaged in
commerce." The third and most questionable class of employees
included drivers and handlers of goods that had been shipped in
interstate commerce, and delivered to the warehouse, but that were
destined for delivery within the state. The question faced by the
56. Willmark Serv. Sys., Inc. v. Wirtz, 317 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1963); 29 C.F.R. § 776.12
(1973).
57. Clougherty v. James Vernor Co., 187 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1951).
58. United States v. Capital Transit Co., 315 U.S. 357 (1945); Hayden v. Bowen, 404
F.2d 682 (5th Cir. 1968); Airlines Transp., Inc. v. Tobin, 198 F.2d 249 (4th Cir. 1952); cf.
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947), wherein the Court held that under the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act taxicab drivers, who as part of their daily activity carried passengers
from their hotels, homes and offices to the railroad station were not "engaged in commerce"
because their relationship to commerce was too casual and incidental. It is doubtful whether
this can be reconciled with the concept that de minimis is inapplicable to coverage under the
Fair Labor Standards Act, Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946), and
with the Court's own decision in Capital Transit. The Yellow Cab decision has not been
widely utilized in resolving Fair Labor Standards Act coverage and in all likelihood is of very
little current impact in this area. But cf. Mateo v. Auto Rental Co., 240 F.2d 831 (9th Cir.
1957).
59. Mitchell v. Rennekamp, 251 F.2d 488 (3d Cir. 1958); Wirtz v. Indiana Cablevision,
Inc., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 121 (S.D. Ind. 1967).
60. A firm prepared tax returns and delivered them locally to the customer. The cus-
tomer, of course, mailed the return to the IRS. Preparation of the return was "engaging in
commerce." Hodgson v. Kallas, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 789 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
61. 317 U.S. 564 (1943).
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Court was whether the interstate journey ended with the deposit of
goods at the warehouse, or whether it continued through the ware-
house until the goods reached the door of their ultimate purchasers
and consumers.
To resolve this rather narrow issue the Court classified the
goods themselves into three groups: (1) goods ordered and set aside
by the wholesaler upon special order of the customer; (2) goods that
though not specially ordered, are purchased by the wholesaler in
response to an agreement or understanding between the parties de-
signed to meet the ultimate customer's constant or recurring needs;
and (3) goods purchased with no particular purchaser in mind,
placed in a general common stock for sale and offered to future
unknown purchasers who may desire to purchase the product. With
these three classes the goods in mind the Court stated:
There is no indication . . . that, once the goods entered the channels of inter-
state commerce, Congress stopped short of control over the entire movement
of them until their interstate journey was ended. No ritual of placing goods in
a warehouse can be allowed to defeat that purpose. The entry of the goods into
the warehouse interrupts but does not necessarily terminate their interstate
journey. A temporary pause in their transit does not mean that they are no
longer "in commerce" within the meaning of the Act . . .[i]f the halt in the
movement of the goods is a convenient intermediate step in the process of
getting them to their final destinations, they remain "in commerce" until they
reach those points. Then there is a practical continuity of movement of the
goods until they reach the customers for whom they are intended.6 2
Thus, the courts must look to the employer in question. If he
does not order the goods with a particular customer in mind, but
takes them himself as a customer, the journey stops at his place of
business; the goods have reached a "state of rest." Any further
handling for intrastate customers after they have come to rest is not
being "engaged in commerce.""3 On the other hand, if the wholesaler
62. Id. at 567-68.
63. As will be discussed infra, even if "at rest" these goods "have been moved in
commerce." Although this will not provide individual coverage, it will be sufficient employee
contact to establish enterprise coverage for the entire operation.
There is no agreement as to when in the warehouse goods actually come to rest. Although
unloading the goods from the truck to the warehouse is deemed engaging in commerce,
Mitchell v. Royal Baking Co., 219 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1955), one case indicated that the goods
come to rest at the loading dock of the warehouse. Schultz v. National Elec. Co., 414 F.2d
1225 (10th Cir. 1969).
The First Circuit has indicated to the contrary, holding that both the employees who
unloaded the truck at the dock and the employees that moved the goods from the dock to
their place of rest in the warehouse were engaged in commerce. The court held, and it appears
correct in so doing, that the temporary pause at the loading dock was not an end to the
journey. Sucrs. de A. Mayol & Co. v. Mitchell, 280 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1960). In the recent
case of Brennan v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1973), the Fifth Circuit held
that mail and packages delivered to an office building did not come to rest at the building,
but that elevator operators who carried them within the building were "engaged in com-
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is merely a conduit through whom the customers receive goods from
an interstate shipment, that interstate shipment does not stop at
the warehouse. When goods are specially ordered for a customer to
meet his constant and recurring needs, the warehouseman is merely
a conduit for the interstate shipment, and the employees who han-
dle the goods are "engaged" in that shipment.
The application of the Jacksonville Paper case is well illus-
trated by its companion case, Higgins v. Carr Brothers,4 in which
a wholesale fruit and vegetable dealer received produce from out of
state. The dealer's employees took his wares from store to store, his
customers purchasing from the commingled stock. The issue was
whether the deliverymen for the dealer were "engaged in com-
merce." In accord with the "state of rest" doctrine of Jacksonville
Paper the Court held that the interstate journey of the fruit and
vegetables stopped when they reached the dealer's warehouse, and
consequently the deliverymen who took them from the warehouse
for local sale and delivery were not "engaged in commerce." Like-
wise, employees of a wholesale gasoline distributor have been held
to be "engaged in commerce" if they handle petroleum products
shipped into state by pipeline, stored in the state, but destined to
specific retail distributors within the state.64" '
B. Production of Goods for Commerce
A second basis for establishing traditional coverage is for the
plaintiff to prove that an employee was engaged in the "production
of goods for commerce." Establishing coverage under this doctrine
requires proof of three distinct elements: "production," "goods" and
"for commerce."
1. Production.-There are two broad categories of "produc-
tion" that must be analyzed separately: direct and secondary pro-
duction. Defined in section 3(j) of the Act, 5 direct production in-
cludes "producing, manufacturing, mining, handling, transporting
or in any other manner working on... goods." This extremely broad
definition has been interpreted to include "every kind of incidental
operation preparatory to putting goods into the stream of com-
merce." Cf. Robertson v. Dailey Elec. Supply Co., 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 734 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
As will be discussed infra these goods "have been moved in commerce" and, although
not providing individual coverage, would be sufficient employee contact to establish enter-
prise coverage for the entire business.
64. 317 U.S. 572 (1943).
64.1. Wirtz v. Lunsford, 404 F.2d 693 (6th Cir. 1968).
65. 29 U.S.C. § 203j) (1970).
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merce."66 Thus, working on claims, filing forms,6" drafting plans"8 or
handling negotiable instruments" is "production," as is handling
soft drink bottles that will eventually be filled with liquid refresh-
ment.70 A mechanic is engaged in production of steel when he re-
moves parts from wrecked cars preparatory to delivering the unusa-
ble remains of the car as scrap to the steel mill.71 Even a truck driver
carrying a commodity wholly intrastate is engaged in production,
since the Act itself defines "transporting" as production.72 The sec-
ond and more difficult category of "production" is "secondary" or
indirect production. In addition to the broad definition of "produc-
tion" given above, the statute also defines the term to include any
"closely related process or occupation directly essential to . . . pro-
duction ."3
In ascertaining the existence of indirect or secondary produc-
tion, the first step is to identify and isolate direct production of
goods for commerce. The next question is whether the employee in
question is performing a task that is either closely related or directly
essential to the production. 74 Underpinning the analysis of this sec-
66. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 503 (1945).
67. Public Bldg. Auth. v. Goldberg, 298 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1962); Boisseau v. Mitchell,
218 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1955); Hodgson v. Kallas, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 789 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
68. Craig v. Far West Eng'r Co., 265 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1959).
69. Union Nat'l Bank v. Durkin, 207 F.2d 848 (8th Cir. 1953); Bozant v. Bank of New
York, 156 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
70. Hodgson v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 465 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1972); Wirtz v. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co., 342 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1965); Stewart-Jordan Distrib. Co. v. Tobin, 210
F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1954).
71. Mitchell v. Jaffe, 261 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958).
72. Wirtz v. Ray Smith Transp. Co., 409 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. Intravaia,
375 F.2d 62 (9th Cir. 1967); Mitchell v. Emala & Associates, 274 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1960). If
the transportation is a leg of an interstate movement then, of course, this would also be
engaging in interstate commerce. Furthermore, if the transportation is of goods used in an
interstate transportation facility it would be production of goods for commerce, "for com-
merce" being defined to include for interstate transportation or communication facilities.
Finally, the transportation might merely be part of the total processing of a product that will
be shipped in commerce.
73. 29 U.S.C. § 203() (1970).
74. Prior to 1949 the Act covered all those engaged in production of goods for commerce
and all occupations "necessary" to the production of goods for commerce. 52 Stat. 1060.
Congress believed that this concept of "necessary" tended to suggest "but for" causation that
carried the Act into purely local activity having only a "remote or tenuous" relationship to
commerce. An example given by Congress was a case in which a local dealer in fertilizer sells
the product to a farmer who grows crops that are transported interstate. The fertilizer dealer
might be performing a task "necessary" to the production of goods for commerce. McComb
v. Super-A Fertilizer Works, 165 F.2d 824 (1st Cir. 1948). Congress, however, believed this
was too remote to be "closely related." It was clear, however, that the court had already
placed limits on that term in 10 E. 40th St. Bldg., Inc. v. Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945) where
"necessary" was interpreted to mean more or less "directly necessary." Thus the amendment
replacing "necessary" with "closely related" or "directly essential" did little more than codify
pre-1949 law. It did not substantially narrow the coverage. Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362
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tion are four Supreme Court decisions that mark the outer perime-
ter of secondary production: A. B. Kirschbaum.Co. v. Walling,75
Borden Co. v. Borella,71 10 East 40th Street Building, Inc. v.
Callus, 77 and Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry Co.7"
Those who provide services directly related to production effi-
ciency in or about the premises wherein production takes place are
within the scope of the terms "closely related" or "directly essen-
tial." In A. B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,71 the employer owned a
building housing tenants engaged in the manufacture of clothing for
interstate transportation. Given that it is not the employer's busi-
ness (in this case dealings in local real estate) but rather the em-
ployees' connection with commerce that determines coverage, the
Court found that custodial, elevator, and watchman services per-
formed to keep the building habitable for production were suffi-
ciently related to production of the clothing to constitute secondary
"production" thereof."0
Borden Co. v. Borella5 ' likewise concerned coverage of janitorial
and maintenance workers of a general office building owned by the
defendant Borden company. While, unlike Kirschbaum, there was
no direct production of goods for commerce on the premises them-
selves,8" Borden did occupy a portion of the premises in which were
located corporate and managerial offices. The Court held that these
managerial offices of a large interstate firm were obviously closely
related and directly essential to the firm's production of goods for
commerce. The employees performing the custodial services for
these managerial employees were thus sufficiently related to that
commerce to be within the meaning of that term.
The third case in this trilogy dealing with custodial employees
is 10 East 40th Street Building, Inc. v. Callus.83 As in Kirschbaum,
U.S. 310, 317-18 (1960). Pre-1949 cases establishing coverage under the "necessary" language
were cited with approval by Congress and are still relied upon by the courts. At most, only
fringe areas were affected by the amendment. See H.R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
15 (1949) (Mgrs. Statement); 95 CONG. REc. 14874-75 (1949); 95 CONG. REc. 11216 (1949).
75. 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
76. 325 U.S. 679 (1945).
77. 325 U.S. 578 (1945).
78. 362 U.S. 310 (1960).
79. 316 U.S. 517 (1942).
80. See also Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944); Walton v. Southern Pack-
age Corp., 320 U.S. 540 (1944).
81. 325 U.S. 679 (1945).
82. No doubt the employees of Borden engaging in general management of the corpora-
tion were engaged in commerce by utilizing the mails and the telephone. See text accompany-
ing notes 18-20 supra. The making of plans, reports, etc. circulated to other offices would be
"production of goods for commerce."
83. 325 U.S. 578 (1945).
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but unlike the facts in Borden, the employer and owner of the build-
ing was not himself engaged in commerce. However, similar to
Borden and unlike Kirschbaum, none of the tenants (a miscellany
of businesses) were engaged in direct manufacture of goods within
the building itself. About forty-two to forty-eight percent of the
tenants were, however, engaged in interstate operations at other
locations. Thus, with what might be considered the weak points of
both Kirschbaum (employer simply owns local property) and
Borden (no actual direct manufacture of goods on the premises) the
issue before the Court was whether the maintenance employees in
such a building were "closely related or directly essential" to the
production of goods for commerce. Responding in the negative, the
Court simply commented that the situation "spontaneously satis-
fies" the understanding that this was a local activity as opposed to
"interstate commerce." Thus, both removal of the owner from inter-
state activity himself, and removal of the tenants from obvious and
direct production, sufficiently separates custodial employees from,
the production of goods for commerce to deny them coverage. If,
however, the employer is himself an interstate firm operating on the
premises, or if goods are actually manufactured on the premises,
then a sufficient nexus will exist to cover custodial employees who
indirectly aid the interstate activity.
The Court recognized that it was difficult to reconcile coverage
in terms other than a visceral reaction to the facts. In one case the
employer himself is engaged in managerial activities on the prem-
ises and in another the employer rents to others who engage in
managerial activities on the premises. It must be remembered that
it is the work of the employees that forms the basis for coverage."
In each case the employees performed virtually identical tasks,
bearing the same relationship to the movement of interstate com-
merce. Realistically, then, it was the nature of the employer's busi-
ness that determined coverage from non-coverage, an approach that
violates an axiomatic concept of traditional coverage. Furthermore,
the Court ignored the possibility that the managerial employees
were either "engaged in commerce" or in "production of goods for
commerce" due to their preparation and mailing of plans, reports,
and instructions.85 Thus, when the custodial employees made this
84. 316 U.S. at 524.
85. The office employees may have been "engaged in commerce." Hodgson v. Travis
Edwards, Inc., 465 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1972). Those who provide supporting custodial service
might be so closely related to this commerce as to be a part thereof. See Mitchell v. Lublin,
McGaughy & Associates, 358 U.S. 207 (1959).
Alternatively, their activity could be classed as "production of goods for commerce."
Allen v. Atlantic Realty Co., 384 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967); Wirtz v. First State Abstract &
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direct production by managerial employees possible, there was but
a single step between the direct and indirect prQduction, and the
Court's decision in Kirschbaum should have controlled.
Another question raised by Mitchell v. H. B. Zachry & Co.,86
discussed above, is the extent to which preliminary construction of
a manufacturing plant is closely related or directly essential to the
production of goods that will eventually flow from the plant. The
employees of Zachry were constructing a reservoir, between forty
and fifty percent of whose water would be used by industrial con-
cerns located in Texas, but shipping their products interstate.
Although the Supreme Court had previously held that workers on
an irrigation project furnishing water to producers of commerce were
sufficiently connected with the production to justify coverage of the
workers under the Act, Zachry was distinguished as follows:
[Tihe combination of the remoteness of this construction from production,
and the absence of a dedication of the completed facilities either exclusively
or primarily to production, persuades us that the activity is not "closely re-
lated" or "directly essential" to production for commerce. 8
Such language implies that had the employees been construct-
ing a manufacturing plant that would distribute goods in commerce,
their work would have established a sufficiently close connection for
them to be "closely related or directly essential" to the production.
While there is some direct support for this position,88 contrary au-
thority89 and hints in the 1949 legislative history, have led the Secre-
tary of Labor to indicate in his Interpretative Bulletin that employ-
ees of an independent contractor building a new facility that will
produce goods for commerce are not closely related or directly essen-
tial to the production of goods for commerce.8
The Secretary's reading of the Act seems too narrow. It is
clearly established that maintenance, repair and even extension of
existing manufacturing facilities producing goods for commerce are
closely related and directly essential to that production.' In the area
of "engaged in commerce" the Supreme Court all but obliterated
Ins. Co., 362 F.2d 83 (8th Cir. 1966); Public Bldg. Auth. v. Goldberg, 298 F.2d 367 (5th Cir.
1962); Craig v. Far West Eng'r Co., 265 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1959).
86. 362 U.S. 310 (1960).
87. 362 U.S. at 321.
88. Walling v. McCrady Constr. Co., 156 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1946).
89. Parham v. Austin Co., 158 F.2d 566 (5th Cir. 1946); McComb v. Turpin, 81 F. Supp.
86 (D. Md. 1948).
90. 29 C.F.R. §§ 776.17(c), 776.27(c)(1) (1974).
91. Roland Elec. Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657 (1946); materials cited note 90 supra;
H.R. REP. No. 1453, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 14-15 (1949) (Mgrs. Statement); 95 CONG. REc.
14875 (1949).
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the distinction between repairing or expanding existing facilities
and building new ones . 2 As the artificial distinction between repair
and new construction has been obliterated when dealing with inter-
state transportation facilities, so also any such distinction between
expansion of existing facilities and construction of new ones for the
manufacture of interstate goods should be eliminated.93
Interestingly enough the Fifth Circuit has adopted this position
in a suit brought by the Secretary of Labor. The employer in
Hodgson v. Ewing" was an independent contractor engaged in the
leveling of land. A large portion of the argicultural products har-
vested from the graded land were shipped in interstate commerce.
The court held that the employees engaged in the land leveling were
closely related and directly essential to the production of these crops
for commerce. It would appear that the builder who erects a manu-
facturing plant is as close to the production of the goods from that
plant as the land grader is to the production of the farmer's crops.
A similar conclusion had been reached in the earlier Fifth Circuit
case of Archer v. Brown & Root, Inc.5 Here the employer was con-
structing a bridge and also producing the concrete slabs used in its
construction. The court held that the employees who constructed
the facility to be used for the concrete slab production were engaged
in an activity closely related to the production of goods (concrete
slabs) for commerce (interstate facility). The court clearly held that
construction of a facility that would be used to produce goods "for
commerce" was closely related to the production of goods for com-
merce.
Thus, it would seem that if the construction in Zachry had been
of a highway, bridge, or lock dedicated to commerce itself, construc-
tion of such an instrumentality would have been "engaging in com-
merce.""6 Even production of the cement, lumber, or steel used in
the structure would have been "production of goods for
commerce.""7 Had the system been supplying a need or an ingredi-
ent of an interstate producer, the employees who worked on that
92. Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955).
93. This need to make those engaged in construction "closely related" to the production
of goods for commerce has lessened since the introduction of the enterprise amendments in
1961, as amended in 1966. Coverage will be established for those employed by an enterprise
"engaged in the business of construction or reconstruction" without regard to dollar volume
of the business if two or more employees handle, sell or otherwise work on goods that "have
been moved in commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
94. Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1971).
95. 241 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1957).
96. Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427 (1955).
97. Tobin v. Alstate Constr. Co., 345 U.S. 13 (1953); Mitchell v. Emala & Assoc., 274
F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1960); Archer v. Brown & Root, Inc., 241 F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1957).
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system would have been engaged in a process "closely related and
directly essential" to the production of goods for.commerce15 Had
the facility itself been dedicated to production of goods for com-
merce, dicta from the court in Zachry, the recent Fifth Circuit deci-
sions" and the demands of logic would indicate that this too would
be "closely related" to the production flowing from this facility.' °°
However, when none of these factors establishing a direct nexus to
commerce are present, the activity is too far removed to justify
coverage. For example, the manufacturer of brick that is used in the
manufacture of a plant that will produce goods for commerce may
be too far removed. Though the brick may be a necessary step in
the ultimate production of goods, as a "practical" matter it is sim-
ply too far removed from commerce.'0 '
With these broad boundaries in mind, perhaps a few lower
court decisions will illustrate the extent to which apparently "local"
activity can be "closely related or directly essential" to the produc-
tion of goods for commerce. Expanding on the well established prin-
ciple that employees serving as guards or watchmen at plants pro-
ducing goods for commerce are "closely related" to the produc-
tion,' 2 a leading Fifth Circuit case involved a watchman at a local
junkyard where mechanics stripped cars for useful parts that were
then resold locally to the general public.' 3 The stripped hulks, how-
ever, were sold locally to a steel manufacturer for use in the manu-
facture of new steel. Only about 1.67 percent of the junkyard's in-
come was from this sale of scrap. Nonetheless, the watchman at the
junkyard was held to be closely related to the production of steel on
the grounds that unless the cars were guarded from theft they could
not be sold to the steel manufacturer.
Local trashmen who collect refuse from the premises of inter-
state manufacturers have been held to be engaged in activity di-
rectly essential to the operation of the interstate business.'0" Courts,
however, may apply the Callus limitation to hold that trash collec-
98. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949); Mitchell v.
Jaffe, 261 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958); Lewis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 154 F.2d 751 (5th
Cir. 1946).
99. Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1971); Archer v. Brown & Root, Inc., 241
F.2d 663 (5th Cir. 1957).
100. Successful litigation of this position is doubtful, given the current status of the
Interpretative Bulletin. Section 259 of the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62
(1970), protects employers who rely in good faith upon such interpretative rulings.
101. See 29 C.F.R. § 776.17(c)(3) (1973).
102. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944); Walton v. Southern Package
Corp., 320 U.S. 540 (1944).
103. Mitchell v. Jaffe, 261 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958).
104. Shultz v. Instant Handling, Inc., 418 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1969).
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tors who serve a variety of tenants, few of whom actually manufac-
ture goods for commerce, are sufficiently removed from commerce
to preclude coverage for their employees.' 5
The production of an ingredient necessary for the production of
goods eventually shipped in commerce can still be considered
"closely related and directly essential" to final production of those
goods. In Wirtz v. F.M. Sloan, Inc.,!"' a local natural gas company
sold its total output locally to a larger gas distributor, which in turn
sold its commingled gas from many sources to local manufacturers
of goods for interstate commerce. The employees of the small local
gas company were said to be employed in an activity "closely re-
lated or directly essential" to the manufacturing processes that were
three steps away from their activites.
The coverage of employees providing food or sanitary assistance
directly to employees working in a plant that produces goods for
commerce has presented some difficulty. If the production employ-
ees could receive these goods or services elsewhere, the courts have
indicated that the service employees are not "closely related" to
production.'0 On the other hand, if the production employees are
sufficiently isolated or if the employer has restrictive work rules so
that they could not secure necessary alternative services, those who
provide necessary auxiliary services will be considered "closely re-
lated" to the production activity. 0
Among other lines, individuals employed to pick up empty bot-
tles and return them to a local bottling plant are closely related to
the interstate shipment of bottled drinks.' 9 Furthermore, even
though they themselves do not perform the mining, individuals who
engage in exploring for mineral deposits are considered closely re-
lated and directly essential to the mining and interstate sale of such
minerals."10
105. Wirtz v. Modem Trashmoval, Inc., 323 F.2d 451 (4th Cir. 1963).
106. 411 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1969).
107. See Tipton v. Bearl Sprott Co., 9 Wage & Hour Cas. 620 (S.D. Cal. 1950); Harlan-
Wallins Coal Corp. v. David, 303 Ky. 84, 196 S.W.2d 881 (1946); 29 C.F.R. § 776.18(b) (1973).
108. Mitchell v. Anderson, 235 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1955); Hawkins v. E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co., 192 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1951); Consolidated Timber Co. v. Womack, 132 F.2d
101 (9th Cir. 1942); Tobin v. Promersberger, 104 F. Supp. 314 (D. Minn. 1952).
109. Hodgson v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., 465 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1972); Wirtz v. Pepsi
Cola Bottling Co., 342 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1965). Contra, Mitchell v. Hygrade Water & Soda
Co., 285 F.2d 362 (8th Cir. 1960); Clougherty v. James Vernor Co., 187 F.2d 288 (6th Cir.
1951).
110. Bear Creek Mining Co. v. Wirtz, 317 F.2d 67 (1st Cir. 1963). Contra, Mitchell v.
W.E. Belcher Lumber Co., 279 F.2d 789 (5th Cir. 1960), in which the court held that employ-
ees who planted seedling trees for a timber company were too remote from the actual harvest-
ing and transportation of the trees to secure coverage. This decison is particularly at odds
with the Fifth Circuit's later ruling in Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1971).
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Finally, the indefinite character of this entire area can perhaps
be best demonstrated by looking at those who provide goods and
services to the farmer. As we have seen, the Fifth Circuit recently
indicated that a contractor who graded the land to enable a farmer
to plant crops was engaging in an activity "closely related" to the
farmer's eventual production.' Supplying irrigation to farmers has
also been held "closely realted. ' 12 Similarly, the Secretary of Labor
has indicated that the supplying of seed to the farmer is "closely
related" to the production of crops.' Congress, however, has clearly
indicated that furnishing fertilizer to the farmer is not closely re-
lated to crop production,"' and on this basis at least one court has
suggested that supplying feed grain to farmers is not closely related
to the production of their livestock." 5
In summarizing the definition of "production," perhaps all that
can be said is that when the idea of "closely related or directly
essential" to primary production is superimposed upon what seems
to be a relatively restricted concept, the Act, albeit not unlimited
in its scope, reaches into areas that at first glance appear to be
"local" in nature. Measuring this concept is difficult indeed, for how
can it logically be stated that grading the land and supplying water
are closely related to a farmer's production, but supplying him with
fertilizer and feed grain are not?
2. Goods.-The second, and perhaps least controversial, ele-
ment of "production of goods for commerce" is that the "produc-
tion" must be of "goods." As might be expected, the definition is
expansive. The statute states that "goods" includes "wares, prod-
ucts, commodities, merchandise, or articles or subjects of commerce
of any character, or any part or ingredient thereof.""' 8 It is probably
not an exaggeration to state that if it can be "produced" within the
previously discussed meaning of this term, it will be a "good." The
courts have held that drawings, plans, and specifications are
"goods,"" 7 as are documents, reports, fiscal statements,"' and nego-
tiable instruements. '5 The Supreme Court has even gone so far as
to state that the statutory term "subjects of commerce of any char-
111. Hodgson v. Ewing, 451 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1971).
112. Farmers Reservoir & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 755 (1949).
113. 29 C.F.R. § 776.19(b)(4) (1973).
114. See materials cited in note 74 supra.
115. Mitchell v. Moore, 241 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1957).
116. 29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (1970).
117. Craig v. Far West Eng'r Co., 265 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1959).
118. Allen v. Atlantic Realty Co., 384 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1967); Public Bldg. Auth. v.
Goldberg, 298 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1962).
119. Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
120. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502-03 (1944).
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acter [includes] ideas, wishes, orders, and intelligence," and that
"telegraphic messages are clearly 'subjects of commerce' and hence
. . . are 'goods' under this Act."' 0 Cattle, 21 and even dir' 22 come
within the term. Objects not themselves the subject of commerce,
such as boxes and bottles, 123 are also "goods." Ice used by shrimp
boats to preserve their catch is a "good," even though consumed
entirely for the purpose of preserving the shrimp and not in any way
becoming a component part of the product. 24
As the statute itself provides, objects are "goods" even though
they are only ingredients or components of the article actually trans-
ported in commerce. Thus, as previously discussed, scrap metal, a
small percentage of which eventually reaches finished steel manu-
factured by another, is still a "good, "125 as is natural gas eventually
consumed by interstate manufacturers in the making of their
goods. ' 2 Buttons sold locally to an interstate clothing manufacturer
and lumber used to manufacture furniture are "ingredients" and
thus "goods."'' 27
Employee activity is usually so closely related or directly essen-
tial to another's production of goods that this secondary basis for
coverage will suffice. Thus, for example, it is often immaterial to
determine whether office workers are producing "goods" when they
prepare documents. If they mail the documents they will be "en-
gaged" in commerce; if they do not, their clerical work in most cases
will be so closely related to the firm's manufacture of goods that
coverage can be based upon activity that is "closely related or di-
rectly essential" to the production of goods for commerce.
In short, most factual situations present alternative bases for
determining traditional coverage. An employee may himself be en-
gaged in commerce or so directly supportive thereof as to be legally
considered a part of commerce. The same tasks may make the em-
ployee directly produce goods that are for commerce. Furthermore,
the employee's work may so directly aid others in their production
of goods for commerce that he can be said to be "closely related and
directly essential" to the production of goods for commerce by
others.
121. Hodgson v. Stockmans Livestock Comm., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 1054 (W.D. Okla.
1972).
122. Mitchell v. Emala & Assoc., 274 F.2d 781 (4th Cir. 1960).
123. Wirtz v. Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 342 F.2d 820 (5th Cir. 1965); Enterprise Box Co.
v. Fleming, 125 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1942).
124. Mitchell v. Independent Ice & Cold Storage Co., 294 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1961). See
also Mitchell v. Standard Ice Co., 14 Wage & Hour Cas. 53 (E.D. Ark. 1959) in which ice
was sold to interstate railroads.
125. Mitchell v. Jaffe, 261 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958).
126. Wirtz v. F.M. Sloan, Inc., 411 F.2d 56 (3d Cir. 1969),
127. 29 C.F.R. § 776.20(c) (1973).
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3." For Commerce.-It is not enough that an employee "pro-
duce" "goods;" these goods must be "for commerce," a phrase that
has many turns of ambiguity.
First, what is meant by "commerce?" The term is not intended
to mean "commercial." The Act uselessly defines "commerce" as
"trade, commerce, transportation, transmission or communication
among the several states or between any State and any place outside
thereof.' 1 28 Goods delivered locally to the United States Govern-
ment to be shipped interstate by the government and ultimately
consumed thereby are "for commerce.' '2 9 Likewise, the activity of
a governmental agency itself can be considered to be engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. Although
prior to 1974 governmental employees were not covered by the
Act,'30 private employees could secure coverage when they provided
services, such as custodial and maintenance, closely related and
directly essential to the production of goods "for commerce" by the
governmental employees.' 3 ' Similarly, there is some authority that
the ultimate interstate shipper may utilize the object himself for his
personal enjoyment and still come within the scope of the statutory
phrase. 32 The interstate shipper may even be a charitable or reli-
gious institution.' 33 Finally, as the definition in the Act indicates,
the "commerce" involved may be between the United States and
128. 29 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1970).
129. Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950). An interesting case
predating the above Powell decision was Selby v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 175 F.2d 143 (6th
Cir. 1949), indicating that employees engaged in remodeling structures used to construct the
atomic bomb were not engaged in the production of goods for commerce because the "bomb"
was not "for commerce" but to destroy commerce. Presumably that decison was overruled
by the Supreme Court in Powell.
130. Section 3(d) of the Act defines "employer" to exclude the United States, and in a
limited form, state and local governments. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970). Section 6(a)(1), (2) of
the 1974 Amendments, supra note 2, redefine "employer" and "employee" to include nonmil-
itary federal employees and most state and local employees.
131. Public Bldg. Auth. v. Goldberg, 298 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1962).
132. Bodden v. McCormick Shipping Corp., 188 F.2d 773 (5th Cir. 1951). Cf. the Act's
definition of "goods" excluding goods "after their delivery into the actual physical possession
of the ultimate consumer thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor thereof."
29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (1970). On this basis it might be said that once delivered into the hands
of the "ultimate consumer" although perhaps "for commerce" when produced, they lose their
character as "goods." Thus, purely local activity such as selling food, gasoline or souvenirs,
even though the seller has reason to believe the purchaser will transport them out of the state
for his personal use is not production of "goods" for commerce. Dial v. Hi Lewis Oil Co., 99
F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Mo. 1951); Hodgson v. Hyatt Realty & Inv. Co., 20 Wage & Hour Cas.
1191 (M.D.N.C. 1973). Of course, if the gasoline or food is a necessary part of the flow of
commerce, coverage may be established without resort to the definition of "goods." Hodgson
v. Pipeline Oil Co., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 1225 (W.D. Ky. 1972). Likewise, if the "ultimate
consumer" is himself a "producer" then the restriction on the definition of "goods" has no
application. See Mitchell v. Independent Ice & Cold Storage Co., 294 F.2d 186 (5th Cir. 1961).
133. Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1954).
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foreign nations, and is even applicable to a fishing boat that does
not travel between states but simply leaves the state for interna-
tional waters and later returns to the state without even entering
another jurisdiction. 4
Secondly, the other word in the phrase must be analyzed. The
word "for" implies some form of intent, knowledge or desire. 3 The
intent, knowledge or desire of the employee is largely irrelevant.
Whether a good is or is not "for commerce" is something within the
control of the producer-employer, and it is his subjective state of
mind that traditionally has been held to control.' 31 Ignorance or
mistake on the part of the employees as to the destination of
"goods" does not deprive them of coverage.
If the producer actually intends or expects the goods to enter
commerce, and they do so move, obviously this element of coverage
is satisfied. Even if the producer's connection with the product is
severed long before the good or its products move via the purchaser
into the stream of commerce, coverage still exists for the original
producer.
Problems of interpretation can arise, however, if the producer
intends or expects the goods to enter commerce, but in fact they do
not, and conversely, when the goods actually enter commerce but
there is no direct evidence of the producer's actual knowledge or
intent that they do so. With respect to the first issue, it could be
argued that regardless of a producer-employer's intent, if the goods
do not actually reach the channels of interstate commerce there can
be no coverage of the producing employees. The Act, as well as the
Constitution, require a nexus or relationship to commerce. The lim-
ited authority that exists on this question, however, indicates that
coverage will be found if there was an intent that the objects reach
commerce, regardless of their actual resting place. 31
A more common, and perhaps more difficult, problem is pre-
sented when the goods actually reach the stream of commerce with-
out any direct evidence of the producer-employer's knowledge or
intent. The Supreme Court has held that no direct evidence of the
employer's knowledge or intention is required.131 Subjective ele-
ments can be established by inferences flowing from objective fac-
tors. An employer is held to know the usual routes of his products.
Thus, if the employer using his knowledge or reasonable inferences
134. Mitchell v. Independent Ice & Cold Storage Co., 294 F.2d 186 (7th Cir. 1954).
135. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 121 (1946); Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall,
317 U.S. 88, 92-93 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941).
136. Id.
137. Goldberg v. Arnold Bros. Cotton Gin Co., 297 F.2d 520 (5th Cir. 1962).
138. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 121 (1946).
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therefrom would have realized that the goods would enter the
stream of commerce, he is chargeable with the necessary knowl-
edge. 139 Liability cannot necessarily be avoided by the employer's
"transparent claim of ignorance;""' once the plaintiff proves that
the goods actually reached commerce, the inquiry is whether the
defendant knew or should have known the usual routes of his goods.
Although knowledge is theoretically a question of fact, and objective
factors present only inferences that the fact finder may accept if he
so chooses, the courts have tended to treat this element as a ques-
tion of law to be resolved against the employer any time he has
reasonable grounds to anticipate that in the ordinary and normal
course of business some part of his production will move into other
states."'
Having thus surveyed the basic premises of traditional or indi-
vidual coverage, it might be well to reiterate that de minimis is not
a concept applicable to coverage under the Act.' That a small
percentage of the employer's total business is interstate or that only
a small percentage of the goods produced are "for commerce" is
immaterial. The duty is upon the employer to segregate completely
his intrastate from his interstate work. If during a work week an
employee is "engaged in commerce" or in the "production of goods
for commerce" he is entitled to protection under the Act for that
entire work week regardless of the small amount of time that was
devoted to interstate work.13 Thus, under traditional, individual
coverage an employee might be covered one week but not the next,
depending on what he did or the destination of the goods on which
he worked during the week. Similarly, there could be two employees
doing virtually indentical work, one covered by the Act and the
other not, depending on whether the employer had successfully seg-
regated his intrastate from interstate activity. Because it was based
solely on employee activity, coverage under traditional concepts
thus took on a patchwork appearance, and the desire to right these
discrepancies stimulated the appearance of the enterprise concept.
139. Mitchell v. Jaffe, 261 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1958); Tobin v. Celery City Printing Co.,
197 F.2d 228, 229 (5th Cir. 1952).
140. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v. Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 93 (1942).
141. See Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U.S. 108, 121 (1946); Hodgson v. Callihan, 21 Wage &
Hour Cas. 906 (E.D. Ky. 1974); Hodgson v. Vallejo Quicksilver Mining Co., 20 Wage & Hour
Cas. 81, 83 (E.D. Cal. 1971).
142. Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); Hodgson v. Travis
Edwards, Inc., 465 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1972); Dickenson v. United States, 353 F.2d 389 (9th
Cir. 1966).
143. 29 C.F.R. § 776.4 (1973).
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Ill. ENTERPRISE COVERAGE
In devising the enterprise concept in the 1961 and 1966 amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act, Congress was compelled by
numerous motives. The first, and most obvious, was that since tra-
ditional coverage had depended on the activities of individual em-
ployees, a given employer might have some employees covered while
others were not. To a large degree, the amendments addressed a
need to end this patchwork of coverage and bring within the Act's
protections all employees of a particular employer. Secondly, Con-
gress singled out certain industries where previous coverage under
the Act had been spotty at best and whose workers were believed
to be in particular need of protection.' Finally, for reasons to be
discussed below, the enterprise concept provided a basis for expand-
ing the total scope of coverage based on employee contact with
commerce and brought within the Act an expanded class of employ-
ers not previously covered because they had no employees "engaged
in commerce" or in the "production of goods for commerce." By
indicating that an "enterprise engaged in commerce" included one
with employees handling goods that "had been moved in com-
merce," Congress went far beyond traditional coverage concepts,
approaching, if not exceeding,' congressional power to regulate all
activities that "affect commerce."
In 1961 a bill suggesting an "affecting commerce" basis for
coverage was narrowly defeated." 6 In the 1961 amendments this
basis was considered and rejected, the majority believing that the
enterprise approach to coverage was still short of Congress' full
power to regulate commerce; 4 7 yet the amendments expanded tre-
mendously the number of employees brought within the Act's cover-
age." Subsequently, the constitutionality of the enterprise ap-
proach to coverage was sustained by the Supreme Court in
Maryland v. Wirtz."9
144. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970) (construction, laundries, schools and hospitals).
145. S. REP. No. 145, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 94-96 (1961) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 1451.
146. Id. at 43.
147. Id. at 43-44.
148. It was estimated that the 1961 amendments add 4.1 million employees to the Act's
protection. S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145. The 1966 amendments were said to give coverage
to 7.2 million more employees. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). This gave
coverage to over 75% of the privately employed persons in the United States. As the Act
provided for gradually reduced dollar volumes necessary for coverage, that percentage of the
work force covered by the Act has undoubtedly increased. The enterprise aspects of the 1974
amendments will not increase coverage, but removal of governmental exemption and adding
domestic employees will increase the Act's total impact.
149. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In Maryland v. Wirtz two arguments were advanced. The first
was that FLSA coverage to state schools or hospitals had such a tenuous relationship to
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Analyzing the terms of the statute creating enterprise coverage
is a tortuous journey that must begin with the Act's substantive
provisions. Sections 6150 and 7151 provide minimum wage, equal pay,
and maximum hour protection to every employee employed in an
"enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce."
To determine the meaning of the phrase "enterprise engaged in
commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," it is neces-
sary to refer to the definition sections of the Act. Section 3(r) defines
enterprise as "related activities performed (either through unified
operation or common control) . . . for a common business purpose
S. .,52 and describes four situations that conceivably could fall
within this general definition but that Congress specifically elimi-
nated from the concept. 53 As the Act was being expanded in 1966
to cover public hospitals, schools, and transit systems, the 3(r) defi-
nition, which included a requirement of "business purpose," added
a caveat that the operation of these hospitals, schools, and transit
systems was for a "business purpose."
The phrase "enterprise engaged in commerce or in the produc-
tion of goods for commerce" is defined in section 3(s) as an enter-
prise (as previously defined) that "has employees engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce, including [or]
employees handling, selling or otherwise working on goods [or ma-
terials] that have been moved in or produced for commerce...
(emphasized word omitted and bracketed words added by the 1974
amendments). In addition to employee contact with commerce, the
definition requires that the enterprise fall into one of the four classi-
fications: (1) having an annual gross volume of sales made or busi-
ness done of not less than 250,000 dollars; (2) being engaged in
laundering, cleaning or repairing of clothing or fabrics; (3) being
engaged in construction, reconstruction, or both; or (4) being en-
gaged in the operation of a hospital, school or college. The definition
commerce that Congress lacked the power to regulate the same under the "commerce clause."
Secondly, federal intervention into wages paid by the state to its employees was said to violate
the eleventh amendment to the Constitution. Both arguments were rejected.
150. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a) (1970).
151. 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1970).
152. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1970).
153. The proviso to § 3(r) indicated that retail establishments under independent own-
ership shall not be considered part of an enterprise by virtue of an agreement (1) to limit their
sale to particularly specified goods, (2) to join others for purpose of collective purchasing, (3)
to exclusively deal in specified products, or (4) to occupy premises leased to it by a person
who leases premises to other establishments. This specifically removed from the enterprise
definition independently owned franchise operations, cooperative purchasing arrangements,
and shopping centers. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1970).
154. 20 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
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excludes the "mom and pop" store by providing that any establish-
ment employing only the owner or members of his immediate family
cannot itself be an enterprise, nor can the volume of sales be in-
cluded in determining any minimum amount for establishing cover-
age elsewhere in the enterprise.
To summarize, the method utilized by Congress in establishing
an enterprise's nexus with commerce contained two elements. The
first was employee contact: a covered enterprise must have employ-
ees either traditionally covered ("engaged in commerce" or in the
"production of goods for commerce") or handling or working on
goods that "have been moved in commerce." The second element
for most businesses is minimum size or dollar volume of sales made
or business done. However, certain specified industries-laundries,
construction, schools, and hospitals-do not have to meet this mini-
mum dollar-volume requirement. Thus, an enterprise engaged in
commerce is a "related activity performed through unified opera-
tion or common control for a common business purpose" that has
employees engaged in commerce, or in the production of goods for
commerce, or who are handling or working on goods that "have been
moved in commerce;" and which enterprise must have an annual
gross income of 250,000 dollars or be engaged in one of the three
specified industries. Once established as an enterprise engaged in
commerce, all employees in the enterprise are given the protections
of the Act, including workers with no direct contact with commerce
and those who may work at different establishments within the
"enterprise."
A. Enterprise
The recent Supreme Court decision of Brennan v. Arnheim &
Neely, Inc.'55 provides a starting point for an analysis of the defini-
tion of "enterprise." The Court there noted that the three main
elements of the statutory definition of "enterprise" were: (1) related
activities, (2) unified operation or common control, and (3) common
business purpose. Although treated separately, these elements in-
volve a considerable amount of similarity and overlap, particularly
between "related activity" and "common business purpose."
1. Related Activities.-The employer in Arnheim managed
commercial, office, and residential properties in which it had no
measurable proprietary interest. At the time of the litigation it had
under its management nine such complexes in Pennsylvania, each
independently owned. As part of its management duties Arnheim
155. 410 U.S. 512 (1973).
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obtained tenants for the buildings, negotiated leases, collected
rents, evicted tenants, and hired, fired and paid the employees at
each building. It was on behalf of these employees that the Secre-
tary of Labor brought suit.
The Third Circuit determined that "related activities" referred
to the activities of each of the building owners. As the individual
owners had no connection between each other, and were in no way
engaged in a "common business purpose" among themselves, Arn-
heim & Neely, as manager of these buildings, was held not to be an
enterprise. The court's conception as to whose activities must be
"related" is so patently erroneous that it hardly needs comment.
The Fourth Circuit had previously held, and correctly so, that
"[i]t is the defendants' activities at each building which must be
held together by a common business purpose, not all the activities
of all owners of apartment projects."' 5 Agreeing with this interpre-
tation, the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit. Factually,
the Court recognized that the buildings' owners were not united in
some form of business relationship. The Court, however, correctly
recognized the spurious analysis of the Third Circuit and concluded
that the absence of a relationship between the defendant-employer's
customers was immaterial. It is the activity of the defendant, the
business itself, that must be evaluated to determine "relatedness"
under the Act. "Enterprise" is not defeated by the fact that the
employer is engaged in but a single business.'5 7 That this business
is performed at different establishments owned by different persons
was certainly not controlling. An accounting firm may perform its
services for and on the premises of many unrelated businessmen,
and a construction firm may build structures at different locations
for different landowners. Clearly, each of these businesses can itself
be an enterprise. In this regard the Supreme Court correctly recog-
nized that the employer's activities of managing real estate were
"related," in that they were tied together by a single and common
purpose.
After disposing of this red herring the difficult question arises
as to when ostensibly different activities are "related." ' 8 The legis-
lative history to the 1961 amendments indicates that "related"
means the "same or similar,"' 59 hardly a helpful or narrowing defini-
tion. The Report continues, however, with comments and illustra-
tions that have been repeatedly referred to in subsequent judicial
156. Shultz v. Falk, 439 F.2d 340, 346 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S.
190 (1973).
157. Brennan v. Hatton, 474 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1973); 29 C.F.R. § 779.204(a) (1974).
158. 29 C.F.R. § 779.208 (1974).
159. S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145, at 41.
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decisions; specifically, three classes of "related activities" are men-
tioned. The first is a so-called "horizontal" arrangement, such as
individual retail stores in the same business, serving as a chain, 6'
or differing departments in a single establishment."6 ' Activities are
also "related" when they are "auxiliary" or service activities con-
nected with the primary business operation, ' such as central office
support, bookkeeping, auditing, purchasing, or advertising. The
final broad classification mentioned by Congress is a "vertical" en-
terprise wherein different entities manufacture, warehouse, and re-
tail a particular line of products.'6 3
Although this scheme aids one in classifying the types of activi-
ties, and indicates that Congress did not desire a restricted interpre-
tation, it provides few specifics. Only one example of unrelated
activities is mentioned, the operation of retail apparel stores and a
lumber business.'64 Congress indicated that these two activities were
"unrelated" to each other, and consequently the dollar volume of
each establishment could not be added together to reach the neces-
sary amount (although nothing would keep each business, lumber
yard, and apparel store from being two separate enterprises should
each generate sufficient income).
The legislative history to the 1966 amendments adds a bit more
light to the question. Congress indicated that activities would be
"related" if they had a "reasonable connection" with each other.'65
The fact that activities were "somewhat different" would not de-
stroy relatedness. Furthermore, the Senate Report indicates quite
clearly that independent incorporation, physical separation or some
degree of independent management does not keep activities from
being "related." Thus, except when dealing with "auxiliary serv-
ices," Congress seems to view classes of business as being inherently
either "related" or unrelated. The courts, however, have not fol-
lowed any such categorical approach to the definition.
The earliest and most important decision interpreting the ele-
160. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.204(b) (1974).
161. See 29 C.F.R. § 779.207 (1974).
162. S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145, at 41. The Secretary of Labor also lists as "auxil-
iary" to a primary business: credit rating; promotional activities such as stamps, prizes,
contests; maintenance, repair and decorating; site selection and engineering, guard or protec-
tive service; delivery service; parking; recruiting and training of employees; recreation;
health, and food service to employees; employee insurance plans; alteration, repair, or servic-
ing of goods sold. 29 C.F.R. § 779.208 (1974).
163. 29 C.F.R. § 779.209 (1974).
164. S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145, at 41. The Secretary of Labor has provided
additional examples of patently "unrelated" businesses: Retail grocery store and a construc-
tion business; a bank, a filling station and a bank. 29 C.F.R. § 779.211 (1974).
165. S. REP. No. 1487, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1966) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No.
1487].
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ment of "related" is Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co."'6 There,
the employer was a commercial bank that owned a fifteen story
building. The bank itself occupied the first four floors of the build-
ing, renting the remaining eleven floors to a miscellany of tenants.
There was no question that those who worked in the bank itself were
covered by the Act."7 Similarly, the custodial employees working in
the portion of the bank devoted to interstate work would be tradi-
tionally covered as employees engaged in activity closely related or
directly essential to the production of goods for commerce."8 The
maintenance and custodial staff, however, were rigidly regimented
in an effort to avoid total coverage, with one group serving only the
rental portions of the bank and never the bank itself. Thus under
the Callus"9 doctrine these employees would not be subject to tradi-
tional coverage under the Act. The Secretary proceeded under the
theory that the bank with its banking and real estate leasing opera-
tions was a single enterprise, thus providing all employees with
coverage. The bank argued, inter alia, that operation of a commer-
cial bank and the leasing of commercial office space were not "re-
lated activities." Even if some bank employees have the necessary
contact with commerce, and gross sales are satisified, and there is
common ownership and control, the employer argued that the two
activities of banking and leasing property are nevertheless as unre-
lated as the congressional example of the lumber yard and the ap-
parel store.
Rejecting this argument, the Fifth Circuit found that the opera-
tion of a bank and the rental of commercial office space in the same
building were indeed "related." Thus, the bank was a covered enter-
prise and all its maintenance employees were covered. 7 ' In finding
a "reasonable connection" between the bank and the office rental
business, the court mentioned the following factors, all largely
keyed to the fact that the two businesses occupied the same loca-
tion: the bank had provided itself with room to expand; the office
building in conjunction with a bank spread the per foot cost of
downtown real estate; the bank secured certain tax advantages; the
166. 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966).
167. Bank employees using interstate mails would be engaged in commerce or the
production of goods therefor. See Hodgson v. Travis Edwards, Inc., 465 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.
1972); Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
168. See Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945); A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling,
316 U.S. 517 (1942); Bozant v. Bank of New York, 156 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1946).
169. 325 U.S. 578 (1945).
170. This holding was specifically approved by the Report on the 1966 amendments. It
stated: "A bank may, either directly or indirectly engage in real leasing activities incidental
to or arising from its financial and investment activities." S. REP. No. 1487, supra note 165,
at 7.
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large complex created a public image of stability and security; and
finally, the tenants in the building benefited the bank and were
themselves provided with banking services, giving mutual and re-
ciprocal benefits to each activity. Therefore, given the particular
factual situation, even businesses as widely separated as banking
and real estate rental can be "related. 1 71 Using similar analysis, the
Sixth and Fifth Circuits have also held that the operation of insur-
ance company offices and the rental of office space in the same
building are "related.' 7 2
The concept pioneered by Savannah Bank & Trust is indeed
revolutionary. Congress had used the term "related" in the sense of
outward similarity, but the Fifth Circuit went one step beyond and
held that even ostensibly dissimilar activities can be "related" so
long as they are united by strongly centralized control directing
them to an interrelated "business purpose." Thus, the concept of
"common business purpose," itself an element of "enterprise," is
used to establish the concomitant element of "relatedness."
In his interpretative guidelines, the Secretary of Labor has also
advocated the amalgamation of the two terms: "Generally, the an-
swer to the question whether particular activities are 'related' or
not, will depend in each case upon whether the activities serve a
business purpose common to all the activities of the enterprise."''7 3
It cannot be stated categorically that the operation of a bank
or an insurance company is "related" to the leasing of property.
Although the two activities are not outwardly similar and thus do
not fall within any per se classification, under the analysis pioneered
by Savannah Bank & Trust and adopted by the Department of
Labor, they can be related. Ostensibly unrelated activities are ex-
amined in a factual context and, given the right combination of
circumstances, can become related.
Because of the factual contest, unrelated activities were indeed
found to be "related" in a Sixth Circuit case, Schultz v. Deane-Hill
Country Club, Inc. "I The business operations involved there were a
restaurant, a sports supply shop, rental of sporting equipment, and
professional athletic instruction. In the abstract such operations
would not seem to be "related," since they are not the "same or
similar" in any absolute sense as Congress used the term nor are
they necessarily "auxiliary," contributors to a primary business.
171. Accord, Wirtz v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 365 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1966).
172. Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1970); Wirtz v. Columbian
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 380 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1967).
173. 29 C.F.R. § 779.206(b) (1974).
174. 310 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Tenn. 1969), afl'd, 433 F.2d 1311 (6th Cir. 1970).
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Nonetheless, when brought together in the setting of a country club,
the court had no difficulty in correctly holding, that these activities
at the same location, directed toward the total service of club mem-
bers, were "related activities." Similarly, a highway truck or tourist
stop that sells petroleum products and automotive parts and acces-
sories, services automobiles, provides wrecker service, operates a
motel for families and truckers, has a restaurant, sells novelties, and
keeps a menagerie could be said to be engaged in "related" activi-
ties. If each operation were at a separate locale with separate trade
names serving separate customers, they would probably be consid-
ered unrelated.Clearly, however, if at the same location, they are
serving the total needs of a particular class of customers, the interre-
lationship is so strong that "enterprise" coverage cannot be denied.
The Secretary's guidelines provide additional examples. The
operation of a retail establishment and a construction business are
conceded, in the abstract, not to be related. "Where, however, the
retail and construction activities are conducted for a common busi-
ness purpose, they may be 'related'. . . . Thus, a retail store enter-
prise may engage in construction activities as an additional outlet
for building materials which it sells . . . . It may act as its own
contractor in constructing or reconstructing its own stores.' 7
Some recent Florida decisions illustrate how different products
and even different classes of customers do not prohibit different
activities from being "related." In one case, separate firms engaged
in land planning and development, in renting apartments, and in
furnishing water and sewage utilities to a community were found to
be "related."'76 This relationship was established because the com-
munity wherein all of this activity took place was a planned com-
munity being developed by the defendant-employer. The fact that
all of these apparently unrelated activities related to the develop-
ment and maintenance of this community was sufficient. Similarly,
in another case the construction, sale, and maintenance of such
diverse structures as luxury apartments, condominiums, a medical
clinic, a clubhouse, and a gourmet food store were held "related"
when they were part of an integrated real estate development. 7 '
Thus, "relatedness" can turn on the goal of the businessman.
Although the single goal of profit is not sufficient to unite diverse
activities into related ones, the courts have correctly recognized that
a particular class of customers or a single integrated business
scheme composed of diverse economic units can be "related." Yet
175. 29 C.F.R. § 779.206(b) (1974).
176. Hodgson v. Davis M. Woolin & Son, Inc., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 91 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
177. Hodgson v. Leeco Gas & Oil Co., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
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this concept can be carried too far. In Hodgson v. Veterans Cleaning
Service,1 7 8 a particular employer was engaged in commercial clean-
ing and maintenance, residential cleaning through a "rent-a-maid"
service, and in operating a "roto-rooter" sewer service. Although
commercial and residential cleaning might be ostensibly "similar,"
sewer service is hardly "similar" to the two other cleaning services.
"Relatedness," if it exists, must be found in a united "common
purpose" of these three operations. On such a basis the district court
found these three activities "related." Rather than concentrating on
the abstract "relatedness," on the service of particular customers,
or even on a unified business goal, the court found persuasive the
total integration of the business operation. A single family operation
with a central office and warehouse, it held itself out to the public
under a cleaning service banner. Whereas other cases have concen-
trated primarily upon external manifestations (i.e., what goods or
services the business performed and for whom), this court focused
internally upon the business organization. This approach is danger-
ous. While in certain cases a high degree of integration might help
prove or disprove the "relatedness" of the activities performed, or
might establish the "auxiliary" nature of certain activities, Con-
gress clearly did not desire internal decentralization to defeat other-
wise "related" activities. Conversely, internal centralization does
not equal relatedness. Something more than integration should be
required."'
Faced with an even more extreme case than that in Veterans
Cleaning Service, a Texas court refused to find coverage.18 An em-
ployer operated an air conditioning company, a small commercial
airport, and performed services in oil and gas drilling. The court
referred to the legislative history and indicated that the only com-
mon denominator for these activities was the owner's desire to make
a profit, an element not sufficient to establish relatedness. The
court did not allow the total centralization of management in the
person of the defendant to lead it into a conclusion that these ob-
viously diverse activities were "related."
Courts should not allow an evolution where in the single ele-
ment of central control dominates the other elements of "enter-
178. 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 984 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
179. "Common ownership standing alone does not bring unrelated activities within the
scope of the same enterprise." 29 C.F.R. § 779.211 (1974).
180. Hodgson v. Hatton, 348 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 474
F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1973). The court of appeals held that each of the employees was engaged in
the air conditioning business, and since this fell within the statutory definition of "construc-
tion," no dollar volume was necessary to establish coverage for these employees.
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prise." If economic centralization is given undue weight in deter-
mining "relatedness," virtually every multi-faceted business oper-
ated by a single entity would fall within the definition of "enter-
prise." In gelierically similar activities, however, centralization of
organization and promotion, or lack thereof, might be relevant in
determining "relatedness" and in close cases it could tip the scales.
Unified operation of even apparently dissimilar activities directed
to a common goal could make such activities "related." Neverthe-
less, in generically diverse operations with no unifying goal, internal
centralization cannot be controlling.
Thus, in summary, it can be seen that courts have relied upon
centralized management, physical juxtaposition, appeal to similar
customers, mutually supportative public image, and auxiliary sup-
port toward a single goal and ultimate business scheme, to unite
seemingly dissimilar business activities into a "related activity."''
The question next arises whether the converse is true. May business
operations that are ostensibly quite similar be ruled "unrelated"
simply on the basis of decentralized management, physical separa-
tion, appeal to different customers, or distinct public images? As
indicated earlier, Congress stated that "related" meant "same or
similar,"'' 2 a definition with illustrations carrying implications of
absoluteness. Viewed without a surrounding context, an apartment
house and a motel would appear "similar," since both are multi-
unit dwelling complexes for short term noncommercial use by indi-
viduals. Nonetheless, a recent Tenth Circuit decision, Hodgson v.
University Club Tower, Inc., ' indicates they may not be legally
"related." The court pointed to the separate locations to the two
operations, the nonintegrated nature of their operation and manage-
ment, and the absence of any apparent public connection between
them. Finally, the court relied heavily on the fact that they served
181. The Secretary of Labor has particularly emphasized the importance of physical
location. For example, where a retail store accepts payments of utility bills, provides a
notarial service, sells stamps, bus and theater tickets, the Secretary has concluded: "These
and other activities may be entirely different from the enterprise's principal business but they
may be performed on the same premises and by the same employees or otherwise under such
circumstances as to be part of the enterprise." 29 C.F.R. § 779.210(a) (1974).
Where in such a case the activities are performed in a physically separate "establishment"
from the other business activities of the enterprise and are functionally operated as a separate
business, separately controlled, with separate employees, separate records, and a distinct
business objective of its own, they may constitute a separate enterprise. Where, however, such
activities of the enterprise are intermingled with the other activities of the enterprise and
have a reasonable connection to the same business purpose they will be part of the enterprise.
29 C.F.R. § 779.210(b) (1973).
182. S. REP. No. 1487, supra note 165.
183. 466 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1972).
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different customers and furnished different products: one provided
temporary quarters for transients, while the other provided more or
less indefinite living accommodations.
This analysis is subject to the criticism of a failure to differen-
tiate between the two elements of "related activities" and "common
business purpose." The court erroneously concluded that because a
common purpose was lacking, the activities of operating a motel and
an apartment were necessarily unrelated.
Activities can become "related" in two ways. As Congress spec-
ified, they can be ostensibly the "same or similar." Or, as the courts
have indicated since Savannah Bank & Trust, activities can be
united by centralized management and a particularly focused
"common business purpose." If "related" because they are generi-
cally the same or similar, they will not become unrelated simply
because they are not directed toward a "common business purpose."
Thus, the Texas court may have been correct in concluding from all
the factors that the businesses did not have a common purpose, and
hence that they could not be an "enterprise." The court was incor-
rect, however, in its conclusion that because they lacked a common
purpose they could not be "related."
This area of "related activities" can perhaps best be sum-
marized by examining a recent case arising from within the Fifth
Circuit involving an employer who operated three businesses: the
sale and servicing of automobiles, the sale and servicing of farm
equipment, and the sale of automobile casualty insurance.'84 On the
surface, one probably would conclude that selling automobiles and
farm equipment might be sufficiently similar to be "related
activities" whereas selling insurance has perhaps only a tenuous
similarity to the two other business operations. In the particular
context in which the case arose, however, the court reached the
opposite conclusion. The selling of automobile insurance was held
"auxiliary" to the automobile business, because the availability of
immediate insurance coverage was advantageous to the car buyer
and provided a unique market to the car and insurance seller. When
analyzing the relationship between the farm implement business
and the automobile business, however, the court could not find a
sufficient nexus. Emphasizing the separate physical locations of the
two businesses, their lack of integration of management and support
services, and the fact that neither contributed to the image or opera-
tions of the other, the court indicated that this lack of a symbiotic
184. Hodgson v. Harvey Motor Co., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 493 (W.D. Tex. 1971), aff'd
without opinion, 461 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1972).
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relationship kept two relatively close classifications of business from
being "related."
Again, as the Tenth Circuit did in University Club Tower, this
court failed to distinguish between the two distinct elements "re-
lated activities" and "common business purpose," instead treating
the two as a single integrated unit ("related activities for a common
business purpose"). Though ostensibly unrelated, the mutually sup-
portative nature of the insurance and car sales business, their physi-
cal location, and the common customers shared by both might eas-
ily combine to make these ostensibly unrelated businesses "related"
by a common purpose. Although automobile and farm equipment
sales may or may not be sufficiently similar to be considered "re-
lated" per se, that issue need not be argued. If they are sufficiently
removed from each other in location, management, and public iden-
tification, the court should have held simply that they did not sat-
isfy the element of "common business purpose."
Thus, a single firm may manage residential and commercial
real estate at many locations. While the duties at each location may
differ, the essence of the business of each is identi-
cal-management.1 5 The activities are "related" because they are
identical. Similarly, a single owner may control three corporations,
the first operating a wholesale grocery business, the other two oper-
ating retail grocery outlets, but all three dealing with identical
goods-groceries. Although not identical, the activities are so simi-
lar that no question can be raised as to their relatedness. '86 Further-
more, the wholesale activity is a support or "auxiliary" service di-
rected toward a primary retail activity. An employer who provides
protective guard services and investigative detective work has but
a single enterprise.'87 Again, the nearly identical form of work would
compel the court to conclude that investigative work and protective
service are "related," notwithstanding the requirement imposed by
law for separate licensing.
The above examples of "relatedness" are not defeated by a
subsequent showing that these activities are directed toward differ-
ent business purposes. Of course as a factual matter the more identi-
cal the products or services, the more likely it will be that a "com-
mon business purpose" will exist. As the business activities become
185. Brennan v. Arnehim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512 (1973); Shultz v. Falk, 439 F.2d
340 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 190 (1973).
186. Wirtz v. Barnes Grocer Co., 398 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1968). This case incidentally
provides an excellent example of combining vertical (wholesale-retail) and horizontal (retail-
retail) relatedness.
187. Hodgson v. Arlington Protective Agency, Inc., 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 666 (E.D. Va.
1972).
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less similar to each other, however, it becomes increasingly possible
that the activities will be directed to different business purposes.
Rather than quibbling over whether somewhat distantly related ac-
tivities are "similar" and thus "related," the courts should concede
the relatedness of the activities and analyze whether or not they are
sufficiently focused toward a "common business purpose."
Congress probably envisioned a test of "relatedness" that fo-
cused largely on the outward similarity or dissimilarity of the busi-
ness activities. By going beyond that objective concept and finding
"relatedness" in the existence of a common or closely interrelated
business objective, the courts may have extended coverage of the
Act beyond the initial expectations of Congress. It is likely that the
legislature conceived of three relatively independent elements: (1)
activities outwardly similar (or supporting a primary business as an
auxiliary activity), (2) activities under centralized control, and (3)
activities having a common business purpose. No enterprise would
exist unless all three elements were present. When the courts al-
lowed the term "related activities" to be satisfied by proof of a
''common purpose," the Act's coverage necessarily was given more
breadth than a literal reading of the terms would suggest. Yet this
does not mean that the courts were acting completely without legis-
lative support. Congress probably had no clear conception of what
it meant by these terms or exactly how far coverage under the enter-
prise concept should extend. Moreover, the draftsmen did not
clearly state that the elements of enterprise could not be interre-
lated. In fact, in defining "related activities" the 1961 Report talked
of "auxiliary services" that would have little outward similarity to
each other but that would definitely relate to the "common pur-
pose." With only the vaguest concept in mind, Congress left a large
uncharted area for judicial exploration, and apparently it has not
been particularly displeased with the performance of the courts.
Specific cases that expanded coverage were cited with approval in
the report of the 1966 amendments, and the 1974 Congress amended
and expanded coverage with no word of disapproval that the courts
had gone too far or too fast.
Like other legal terms, "enterprise" is one that is recognized
when seen, but incapable of precise definition. Ideas of "related-
ness," "common control," and "common business purpose" gener-
ally will be elements apparent in most businesses that "sponta-
neously satisfy" the abstract notion of an "enterprise." Not infre-
quently, however, a business operation will spontaneously satisfy
the notion of "enterprise," yet each of the elements will not fit
neatly into the definition contrived for the concept. In these cases
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the courts can either ignore the concept and apply the literal re-
quirements of the Act, or apply the underlying thrust of the legisla-
tion using the concept that Congress was attempting to express with
the definitional terms. The three elements would thus be viewed as
guidelines only, rather than rigid requirements. Utilizing their his-
toric interpretive function the courts would find coverage when the
business activity fell within the general class of business operations
that Congress desired to regulate.
The courts have been generally faithful to the underlying con-
gressional purpose. When the businesses have been identical, or
closely similar, the courts have recognized this fact and have found
that they are united in a "common business purpose." When pro-
perly united, even widely dissimilar businesses have been held "re-
lated." The courts have faltered, however, in their failure to use
"common business purpose" as an independent element when busi-
ness activities are somewhat similar. Similar businesses are, by con-
gressional definition, "related." To use the lack of a unifying pur-
pose to declare arguably similar businesses "unrelated" eliminates
"common business purpose" as a viable analytical element. This
does not mean that results would be changed. Because all three
elements are necessary for enterprise coverage, holding that similar
businesses are "unrelated" is roughly the same as saying they are
not united by a "common business purpose." Nonetheless, such
analysis blurs an understanding of the relationship of the three
elements, and should be avoided.
2. Unified Operations or Common Control.-As the Fifth Cir-
cuit recently stated, the employer "is not exempt from the Act's
requirements solely because it is engaged in only one business."' 88
Neither is there much question of "unified operations or common
control" where a single person, partnership or corporation conducts
multiple operations at numerous establishments.'89 The problem of
"unified operations or common control" arises when two or more
corporate or legal entities each operate one or more establishments.
The Senate Report on the 1966 amendments makes it clear that
"[tihe fact that the firms are independently incorporated or physi-
cally separate or under the immediate direction of local manage-
ment . . . is not determinative of this question."'80 On the other
hand to remain outside the broad net of "enterprise coverage" the
188. 474 F.2d at 11.
189. Shultz v. Falk, 439 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 414 U.S. 190
(1973); Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, 410 U.S. 512 (1973); Wirtz v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust
Co., 365 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1966); 29 C.F.R. § 779.204(b) (1974).
190. S. REP. No. 1487, supra note 159, at 7.
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statute itself imposes some limitations upon particular types of
business relationships. Independently owned retail or service estab-
lishments are not considered unified operations or under common
control solely on the basis of the existence of one of the following
factors:
(1) Exclusive dealing agreement between the retailer and
manufacturer restricting the buyer's choice of products or the
seller's choice of customers. The franchise is a common example
of this exclusion.
(2) Agreement among establishments in the same indus-
try to participate in collective or group purchases. This type of
group activity is common in the grocery industry. Congressional
comments extend such agreements to common advertising, and
perhaps to additional forms of mutual cooperation."'
(3) Occupation of premises leased to the retail or service
establishment by a person who also leases premises to other such
establishments-the typical shopping center arrangement. 12
Thus, Congress again has defined the outer boundaries of each
extreme. Although "enterprise" is not defeated by separate incorpo-
ration or management of establishments, mere contracts between
separately owned and controlled manufacturers and retailers does
not necessarily establish a vertically integrated enterprise. A bona
fide automobile dealer is not part of the manufacturer's enterprise.
Nor will a horizontal enterprise result from independent business-
men in a single industry cooperating through purchasing, advertis-
ing, insurance plans, and unified labor relations. '93 Finally, having
a common lessor will not in itself tie independent businesses to-
gether into a single enterprise. Beyond these examples Congress
expected the courts to make a case-by-case evaluation.
Congress has suggested that control is a factual issue to be
resolved in a case-by-case evaluation of "[w]ho receives the profits,
suffers the losses, sets the wages and working conditions of employ-
ees, or otherwise manages the business in those respects which are
the common attributes of an independent businessman operating a
business for profit." '94
The earliest major case interpreting the element of "common
191. S. REP. No. 145, supra note 147, at 42.
192. 29 U.S.C. § 203(r).
193. 29 C.F.R. § 779.229 (1974).
194. S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145, at 42; for a more complete discussion of when the
permissible franchise evolves into sufficient "control" for enterprise coverage, see 29 C.F.R.
§§ 779.229-.232 (1974).
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control" was Wirtz v. Hardin & Co.,' 95 in which the Fifth Circuit
followed the congressional suggestion of a purely factual evaluation
whether control was being centrally exercised. The facts involved a
horizontal retail food chain of six Piggly Wiggly stores largely owned
by a single entity. Each store was independently incorporated, with
each manager having a share of the corporate store he managed, and
exercising a large amount of managerial responsibility at his store.
Even though the ultimate control of each store obviously rested with
a single controlling entity, the court concluded that there was suffi-
cient independent management and control to remove each store
from the enterprise concept. Thus, this early approach largely ig-
nored the legal relationship between the operational entities and the
centralized power of control, and instead concentrated upon
whether or not, as a factual matter, common control was being
exercised. Although the approach in Hardin & Co. has not been
expressly overruled by later Fifth Circuit decisions, it was substan-
tially destroyed by implicit congressional disapproval in the 1966
Senate Report '96 and today stands alone among various judicial in-
terpretations of "common control."
In West v. Wal-Mart, Inc.,'97 three separately incorporated dis-
count stores were held to be under common control by virtue of the
existence of a single entity with the power to hire and fire individual
managers. The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion where a
single individual controlled three corporations. ' One corporation
controlled a wholesale grocery business, one a single retail grocery
outlet, and the third operated two other retail outlets. The power
of control over the three corporations, coupled with the interlacing
of the wholesale business with the retail outlets, led the court to hold
that the whole operation was under "common control."
The Fifth Circuit itself almost completely undercut its previous
decision in Hardin when it clearly announced a "power of control"
test in Schultz v. Mack Farland & Sons Roofing Co.' The court
began by distinguishing the facts in Hardin, pointing out that the
managers there had almost complete control of their individual
stores and were not subject to summary removal. In contrast, the
court noted that here, although the different managers under Far-
land exercised a degree of independent managerial judgment and
195. 253 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ala. 1964); affd, 359 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1966).
196. S. REP. No. 1487, supra note 165, at 7.
197. 264 F. Supp. 158 (W.D. Ark. 1967); accord, Wirtz v. Wornom's Pharmacy, Inc.,
18 Wage & Hour Cas. 365 (E.D. Va. 1968).
198. Wirtz v. Barnes Grocer Co., 398 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1968).
199. 413 F.2d 1296 (5th Cir. 1969).
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the corporate affairs of the two roofing companies were scrupulously
maintained, nonetheless, the power to control these managers and
the decisions of the two corporations were in Farland's hands. The
court then concluded that the requirement was the power of actual
control, not the exercise of that power.2"0
The Tenth Circuit recently followed the "power of control" test
in a situation where one corporation operated a motel and was a
wholly owned subsidiary of another corporation that owned two
apartments.2"' There was no evidence of the parent's exercise of
actual control over the operations of the subsidiary corporation or
its motel management. Nonetheless, citing the Mack Farland
decision, the court found "common control," ruling that it was the
power of actual control that was determinative, not the exercise of
that power.
Notwithstanding congressional indications in 1961202 that
"common control" was a purely factual question, the rule is now
well established that the first point of inquiry is whether centralized
legal control is being exercised. It is not necessarily who sets wages,
working conditions, prices, or business policy that is of threshold
importance; it is the entity that has the ultimate power to act in
these areas that is determinative. If the power to control these ele-
ments is centrally held, the courts need go no further.
When the element of common legal control is eliminated, how-
ever, and the courts are dealing with independently owned estab-
lishments, factual elements of common control become very rele-
vant. A recent Tennessee district court case0 3 illustrates the inter-
play of the power to control and factual control. The son of a manu-
facturing firm's chief shareholder operated a retail outlet primarily
dealing in the manufacturing firm's products. The son had a large,
but far from controlling, share in the manufacturing firm and had,
in times past, been on its board of directors. Nevertheless, the court
failed to find a "power of control" in either the father (over the son's
retail business), or in the son (over the father's manufacturing busi-
ness). Although tied together by a common product and family
relationship, the two business operations were held to be so rigidly
independent that factually they could not be considered "unified
200. Id. at 1301. See also Shultz v. Morris, 315 F. Supp. 558 (M.D. Ala. 1970), aff'd
sub. noma. Hodgson v. Morris, 437 F.2d 896 (5th Cir. 1971), in which the court in facts virtually
indistinguishable from Hardin, involving as did Hardin the Piggly-Wiggly Stores, applied the
"power of control" test to find independently incorporated stores subject to control by a single
entity were under "common control."
201. Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc., 466 F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1972).
202. S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145, at 42.
203. Brennan v. Electronics Corp., 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 1042 (W.D. Tenn. 1974).
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operations" or under "common control." As a further example, one
can imagine a dealer who is so restricted by a manufacturer as to
price, service, hours of operation, minimum purchase quotas, labor
relations policy, and other matters that all elements of independent
decision have been removed by the contractual relationship. In such
a situation common control would exist not by virtue of ownership
but of control imposed by contract in spite of independent owner-
ship. Similarly, horizontal control among independently owned es-
tablishments could exist if the individual owners created a cartel
limiting individual decision-making to an absolute minimum."'
Thus, if a number of businesses are under the legal control of a
single entity, so that the power to establish policy and make deci-
sions is centralized, this alone will establish "common control" re-
gardless of the factual exercise of that power. When establishments
are independently owned, they can constitute an enterprise only if
their interrelationship factually reduces to a substantial degree an
individual establishment's power to make the day-to-day decisions
commonly made by independent businessmen. Congress gave clear
examples in the Act itself where some limitation of individual
decision-making power is permissible without creating an enter-
prise. At some point, to be determined as a question of fact, how-
ever, independence can be supplanted by sufficient "common con-
trol," resulting in the existence of an enterprise.
3. Common Business Purpose.-The final element necessary
for the creation of an "enterprise" is that the "related activities"
under "common control" be for a "common business purpose." In
expressing the intent that the term mean "for profit," Congress
sought to eliminate eleemosynary, religious, and other similar non-
profit organizations except to the extent that schools, hospitals, and
similar institutions were specifically covered by the Act."°5 It would
appear, however, that ultimate profit for shareholders is not neces-
sary for the "business purpose" requirement to be satisfied. In
Shultz v. Deane-Hill Country Club, Inc."'5 the district court found
204. When Congress was illustrating the factual elements that were to be considered
in resolving "common control" it was addressing a situation wherein the businesses were
independently owned, and ostensibly independent in their control. What Congress was appar-
ently trying to do was to prevent common franchising, exclusive dealing contracts, and
mutual cooperation from uniting otherwise independent businessmen into an enterprise. It
was not really addressing businesses under common legal control, as the 1966 history makes
much clearer.
It must be remembered, however, that these trying relationships must go beyond the
franchise, joint purchasing and advertising, and common rental that Congress placed in the
Act as being outside the concept of "common control." See 29 C.F.R. § 779.232 (1974).
205. S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145, at 41.
206. 310 F. Supp. 272 (E.D. Tenn. 1969), aff'd 433 F.2d 1311 (6th Cir. 1970).
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a private country club to be covered by the enterprise provisions of
the Act. Admittedly, the court did not analyze the problem of "busi-
ness purpose." A distinction can be drawn, however, between purely
charitable organizations that perform services not paid for, and or-
ganizations that sell goods and services above cost, but do not return
a total profit to investors. The former purely charitable organiza-
tions are not impressed with a "business purpose;" the latter, al-
though returning nothing to investors, are still sufficiently similar
to a "business" to establish coverage. Furthermore, the Secretary
has indicated that even eleemosynary or religious organization ac-
tivities that enter the realm of ordinary commercial activities, such
as operating a printing plant, or engaging in publishing activities,
will be treated the same as any other business enterprise. 217
Although the legislative history emphasizes the "business" part
of the definition, Congress must have intended the word "common"
to have some independent meaning. Related activities must have a
"common purpose" beyond the desire to make a profit.218 Interest-
ingly enough, the courts and the Secretary of Labor have not given
any particular attention to the phrase, but as examined above have
analyzed it under the guise of "relatedness" as though it were a part
of that term rather than an independent element of the enterprise
definition.
The two phrases "related activities" and "common purpose"
clearly overlap. Activities that are outwardly quite similar and per-
formed under common control will almost automatically be per-
formed for a "common purpose." Business activities that are out-
wardly dissimilar can be related by a unifying thread of a "common
purpose," which in turn brings them under the Act's coverage. Com-
mon purpose takes on importance only when the activities are "re-
lated" because they are outwardly the same or similar but are di-
rected toward different goals. The courts have failed to make the
necessary distinction and have tended to treat "related activities for
a common business purpose" as a single element, denying that simi-
lar activities are "related" when they lack a common purpose. As
discussed earlier, this unwarranted amalgamation of the elements
has resulted, not necessarily in erroneous results, but in confusing
analysis.
207. 29 C.F.R. § 779.214 (1974).
208. Hodgson v. Hatton, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 549 (S.D. Tex. 1972), rev'd sub. noma.
Brennan v. Hatton, 474 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. University Club Tower, Inc., 466
F.2d 745 (10th Cir. 1972).
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B. Enterprise Engaged in Commerce
Once it is established that all the elements of an "enterprise"
are present, it is still necessary that the "enterprise" have the neces-
sary contacts with commerce. Section 3(s) of the Act"9 provides that
before an enterprise can be "engaged in commerce" two broad ele-
ments must be satisfied: (1) the nature or the size of the business
and (2) employee contact with commerce. If both basic elements are
present, the enterprise will be considered "engaged in commerce"
and all of those employed therein will receive the protections of the
Act.
1. Nature or Size of the Business.-a. Specified Businesses to
Which the Act Applies Regardless of Dollar Volume.-The Act
specifies three industries wherein enterprises with the necessary
employee contact with commerce will be covered regardless of the
dollar volume of business done: (1) laundering, cleaning, repairing
clothing or fabrics; (2) construction, reconstruction, or both; (3)
hospitals, institutions primarily engaged in the care of sick, aged,
mentally ill or defective persons residing on the premises; schools
for mentally or physically handicapped; pre-school, 210 elementary,
and secondary schools, and public, private, profit or non-profit col-
leges."'
Although these terms are largely self explanatory a brief com-
ment upon each might be helpful:
(1) Laundries.-The Secretary of Labor indicated in an in-
terpretive ruling that coin-operated automatic laundries and dry
cleaning establishments were within the meaning of the statutory
term. An industry association sought and obtained judicial review
of this determination, but the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
agreed with the Secretary's ruling holding that coin-operated laun-
dromats and dry cleaning establishments were "engaged in launder-
ing, cleaning or repairing clothing .. ."1212 In additional official
opinions interpreting the statute, the Secretary has indicated that
linen supply"3 and carpet and upholstery cleaning 214 services come
within the Act's coverage.
209. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
210. 29 U.S.C.A. § 203(s)(4) (1974 Supp.), amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)(4) (1970).
211. 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(s)(2)-(4) (1970). The necessary effect on commerce by these
industries was recognized by Congress, and its constitutional power to enact this legislation
was sustained in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
212. National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). See also Hodgson v. Keller, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 1093 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Wirtz
v. Washeterias, 304 F. Supp. 624 (D.C.Z. 1968).
213. 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91:1161-62a (Feb. 3, 1967, Mar. 30, 1967, May 3, 1967).
214. 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91:1162b (May 31, 1967).
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(2) Construction.-The term "construction" has not been
modified by any requirement that the completed structure must be
for immediate sale to third persons. An employer may be engaged
in "construction" even if the construction is for his personal use or
benefit. 2 . It can safely be said that all of the so-called building
trades will be "construction," for example: general carpentry, 26
bricklaying, 217 plumbing,218 heating and air conditioning, 219 tile set-
ting and floor installation,220 electrical contracting2' and painting22
have all easily been held to be "construction." Less obviously, a
court recently held the drilling of water wells to be "construction. ' '22
The Secretary of Labor considers carpet installation, at least in new
buildings, 24 and landscape business done in conjunction with new
construction 25 to be covered by the term. However, architectural
firms, surveyors, and draftsmen who perform these services as inde-
pendent contractors and who are not themselves physically engaged
in on the site construction will not be considered engaging in "con-
struction."
(3) School, Hospitals, and Similar Institutions.-Again the
statute is largely self-explanatory. The Secretary of Labor has indi-
cated that hospitals are institutions "primar[il]y engage[d] in the
offering of medical and surgical services to persons who generally
remain at the establishment overnight, several days, or for extended
periods. '26 Thus, while outpatient clinics are not considered hospi-
tals, 2  homes for the blind are apparently considered sufficiently
related to care of illness to fall within the classification. 28 All forms
215. Wirtz v. Allen Green & Associates, Inc., 379 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1967).
216. Wirtz v. Melos Constr. Corp., 408 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1969).
217. 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91:1020r-s (May 15, 1967).
218. Shultz v. Cove Plumbing Co., 18 Wage & Hour Cas. 869 (W.D. Tex. 1969).
219. Brennan v. Hatton, 474 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1973); Shultz v. Hartin & Sons, Inc., 428
F.2d 186 (4th Cir. 1970).
220. Shultz v. Architectural Interiors, Inc., 19 Wage & Hour Cas. 496 (D. Conn. 1970).
221. 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91:1020g (Oct. 29, 1962).
222. Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz, 413 F.2d 658 (4th Cir. 1969).
223. Brennan v. Journey, 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 775 (N.D. Miss. 1974).
224. 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91:1020p (Aug. 25, 1967).
225. 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91: 1020q-r (Apr. 23, 1968); 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91:1020p-q (Mar. 7,
1968). There are many bases under which employees of an architectural firm could be cov-
ered. For example, they may be individually covered if they work on plans or specifications
that are mailed in interstate commerce. Such employees are "engaged in commerce" or in
the "production of goods for commerce." Other clerical and maintenance employees are
probably engaged in occupations "closely related and directly essential" to the production of
goods for commerce. Finally, if the firm has more than $250,000 per year of sales made or
business done, and has two or more employees with commerce the firm will be an "enterprise
engaged in commerce" under § 3(s)(1) of the Act.
226. 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91:1156p (May 12, 1967).
227. 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91:1156e-f (Jan. 18, 1967).
228. 6 LAB. REL. REP. 91:1156z (June 16, 1967).
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of schools are within the statute itself, including those for the men-
tally or physically handicapped or gifted, pre-school, elementary, or
secondary schools, or institutions of higher education, regardless of
their public, private, profit or non-profit status.
Of course, in order for there to be coverage solely by virtue of
the enterprise being engaged in the operation of a hospital or school,
any operation not "related" to the institution in question would not
be part of the enterprise. For example, recently an issue arose as to
whether employees of a municipal power plant that provided the
sole source of power to two municipal hospitals were within the
hospital enterprise. "29 If these employees were not within the hospi-
tal enterprise they would be municipal employees specifically ex-
empted at that time from coverage by Section 3(d) of the Act."3 ' The
court concluded that the power plant employees were indeed part
of the hospital enterprise and thus entitled to protection under the
Act.
Even if performed within a defined enterprise operating a
school or hospital, certain services might be considered "retail" in
nature and subject to that limited exemption found in section
13(a)(2) of the Act.13' This question might well arise in a hospital
that operates a gift store on the premises, or in a school that oper-
ates a cafeteria. If maintained separately, even though these opera-
tions may be sufficiently "related" to be part of the "enterprise,"
their separateness may be enough to make them "establishments"
qualifying for a retail exemption. 2
Finally, it is important to note that for purposes of the mini-
mum wage and overtime provisions of the Act, many school and
hospital employees will be subject to the administrative and profes-
229. Brennan v. City of St. Louis, 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 628 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
230. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1970). The 1974 amendments would probably bring coverage
to the employees of the power plant regardless of whether they are in the hospital enterprise.
231. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (1970). The retail exemption herein provided does not apply
to any establishment engaged in laundering, or in the operation of a school or hospital. The
idea of "establishment," however, is narrower than "enterprise." Thus, an "establishment"
may be within a larger "enterprise" and if this "establishment" has a retail concept, has a
dollar volume not exceeding $250,000 per year (reduced by the 1974 amendments), and 75%
of its goods and services are not for resale, this establishment would be able to claim an
exemption for all of its employees. This is true even if the larger enterprise is covered by the
Act.
232. Hodgson v. Crotty Bros. Inc., 450 F.2d 1268 (5th Cir.), rehearing denied en banc,
450 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1971). This case involved a food service operation run by a company
at a boarding school. This independent company providing the food service was alleged by
the Secretary of Labor to be so intimately a part of the school that it could not claim status
as a separate "establishment." The court held that it could have separate establishment
status and thus could qualify for the retail exemption.
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sional exemption provided by Section 13(a)(1).23
b. Remainder of the Businesses: Minimum Size Require-
ments.-Aside from those three categories of industries described
above wherein size is irrelevant, all other businesses must have
annual "sales made or business done" in excess of 250,000 dollars.
In enacting this standard Congress made it clear that by fixing a
dollar volume test it was not concerned with profit, but with impact
on commerce measured by inflow of money. In the 1966 amend-
ments Congress abandoned its 1961 attempt to utilize the volume
of goods actually crossing state lines as a relevant factor and instead
legislated on the assumption that any business having 250,000 dol-
lars worth of sales must necessarily "affect" commerce.2 34
The "dollar-volume" test is based upon "sales made or business
done," with the Act defining "sale" as any "sale, exchange, contract
to sell, consignment for sale, shipment for sale, or other dispo-
sition." 13 Given this broad definition extending to arrangements
differing from the retail sale of goods, the courts faced various prob-
lems in construing the term. Quite early the courts held that the
rental of property was a "sale" of that property.21 The 1966 amend-
ments confirmed this interpretation and indicated also that loaning
money or leasing any type of property would fall within the broad
terms of the amended statute.21 Problems quickly arose when the
person who was not the owner of the property was making the dispo-
sition thereof, the example of course being a rental or commission
agent. In Wirtz v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 23 a bank owned
an office building. Rather than directly renting the offices itself, the
bank formed a management company. The management corpora-
tion was a wholly-owned subsidiary that collected the rents, de-
ducted a management fee and remitted the balance to the bank.
The Tenth Circuit indicated that since the management company
marketed the property that was under its control this was a "dispo-
sition" allowing the amount of rent collected, rather than the man-
233. 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1) (1970). The statute empowers the Secretary of Labor to
establish by regulation the particular definition of executive, administrative, and professional
employee. Those regulations, found at 29 C.F.R. §§ 541 et seq. (1974), have the force and
effect of law. Needless to say, administrators, professors, teachers, staff physicians, profes-
sional nurses, and many others will satisfy the Secretary's definition.
234. S. REP. No. 1487, supra note 165, at 7, 26; S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145, at 5.
See also 107 CONG. REc. 5842 (1961) (Staff Report of Labor Subcommittee).
235. 29 U.S.C. § 203(k) (1970).
236. Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857, 862-63 (5th Cir. 1966).
237. S. REP. No. 1487, supra note 165, at 7-8.
238. 365 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1966).
1975]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
agement fee received from the bank, to be the basis for the dollar-
volume test.
The problem of measuring dollar volume to determine the appl-
icability of the retail exemption surfaced in Wirtz v. Jernigan,239 in
which a restaurant owner also sold Greyhound bus tickets. Includ-
ing the gross income received from the passengers for the tickets
would cause sales to exceed the amount necessary for a retail and
service exemption. If, however, the restaurant owner was allowed to
include only his commissions from the Greyhound company for the
ticket sales, his total sales would be within the dollar-volume limits
established for the exemption. The Fifth Circuit held that the total
amount received for the tickets sold to the customers must be calcu-
lated, reasoning that this amount received measured the size of the
business more accurately than would the commission paid to the
businessman for the sale of the tickets alone.
Relying on Jernigan and First National Bank & Trust Co., the
Fourth Circuit held in Schultz v. Falk 40 that when a property rental
and management firm rented premises owned by others, it was the
amount of the rent collected from the tenants, not the amount of
management fees received from the building owners, that was to be
used in assessing the dollar-volume test. On certiorari, and without
citing or distinguishing the supporting authority from the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits, the Supreme Court reversed.241 Concentrating on
the fact that the firm was an enterprise for the purpose of providing
management services to the owners of the buildings, the five-man
majority reasoned that the sale of its services was best measured by
the amount of commissions collected from the owners, since its
compensation was based not so much on the leases themselves but
on the totality of services provided to the property owners.
The Secretary had argued both in the court of appeals and
before the Supreme Court that this case differed but little from that
of a consignment seller. A retail merchant who purchases his goods
from a wholesaler and sells them to the public will have his size
measured by the gross amount received from the sale of the goods,
not by his net profit. Similarly, a commission merchant who merely
has possession of the same goods with the power to sell must have
his size measured by the gross amount received from the retail sale,
not merely the amount of the commission received from the consig-
nor. If this were not true, the regular retail merchant selling 250,000
dollars worth of goods would be a covered enterprise, while the
239. Wirtz v. Jernigan, 405 F.2d 155 (5th Cir. 1968).
240. 439 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1971).
241. Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190 (1973).
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commission agent selling an identical amount would not. Ob-
viously, the impact.of the two merchants on commerce is identical;
thus coverage of the Act should reach both.
Appearing to accept this argument, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that like the retail merchant, the commission merchant would
find his size measured by the gross amount received at retail, not
his commission. The Court, however, distinguished the commission
agent from the management agent in that the commission agent
sells a commodity and his service is complete with the sale, whereas
the rental agent performs a full measure of management services for
the owner of the property throughout the term of the lease. The
Court indicated that under these circumstances it was a more accur-
ate measurement of the business' size and impact on commerce to
look to the amount received as compensation for its primary service.
In closing, the Court even distinguished the situation of a typical
realty or stock broker and indicated that where the sale of the prin-
cipal's property was the primary service, the amount received from
the purchases, rather than the commissions from the principal,
might be the proper dollar-volume test.
Thus, "sales made or business done" was a test devised by
Congress to measure the relevant size of the business operation, a
concept intended to be keyed not to a business' net profits but to
its monetary intake or inflow. In applying this general idea to partic-
ular fact situations it was necessary for the Court to determine the
exact nature of the business being done. For example, the Court
believed that the business of managing commercial buildings was
the sale of managerial services to the owners of the buildings. Al-
though a "rental" can be a sale if made by the owner,242 the thrust
of managerial activities is not rental. Thus, the relevant point of
monetary inflow is not the rents received from the tenants, but the
payment for the primary service being performed-the commission
from the owners as compensation for the management services per-
formed. On the other hand, a commission agent is engaged in selling
chattels. Although this is naturally a service for the owner thereof,
nonetheless the thrust of the agent's activity is the sale of the item,
and therefore the relevant point of monetary inflow is the gross
receipt for the goods sold. In short, the courts must look carefully
to the nature of the business or service being performed. Size is most
242. Cases such as Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966)
and Wirtz v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 365 F.2d 641 (10th Cir. 1966), were reversed. In
these cases the owner of the building was directly or indirectly the beneficiary of the rents
paid, completely unlike the management firm that is a conduit for the delivery of the rents.
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accurately measured by the consideration received for the perform-
ance of that service or given in return for providiug of a good.
Analytically, the majority of the Court in Falk is probably cor-
rect. The best measure of size, as Congress envisioned it, is the
inflow from the primary service being performed. Nevertheless, this
is a rule of extremely difficult application. A single rule that all
inflow must be counted without regard to the nature of the em-
ployer's primary activity for his principal could be used and under-
stood by those affected by the Act. The Court's decision in Falk,
however, makes prediction of coverage extremely difficult. The af-
fected business must now make a speculative evaluation as to the
thrust of the service and what is being received therefor.
2. Employee Contact with Commerce.-In addition to size or
industry qualifications every enterprise must have "employees"
(plural)"' who have the necessary contact with commerce. The req-
uisite contact may be established by fitting the workers in question
into one of three categories: (1) employees "engaged in commerce;"
(2) employees engaged in the "production of goods for commerce,"
which includes any activity "closely related or directly essential" to
that production; or (3) employees "handling or working on goods or
materials that have been moved in commerce."
Until 1974 the necessary employee contact was defined as
"employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce, including employees handling, selling, or otherwise
working on goods that have been moved in or produced for com-
merce .. ."244 The 1974 amendments made two seemingly unim-
portant alterations that have substantial potential impact. 245 First,
the word "including" was replaced with the word "or." Secondly,
the words "or materials" were inserted following the word "goods."
The Act now reads, ". . . . employees engaged in commerce or in
the production of goods for commerce or employees handling, sell-
ing, or otherwise working on goods or materials that have been
moved in or produced for commerce .. ."I" (emphasis added).
The implications of these two apparently insignificant alterations
will be discussed fully, but it should first be noted that the necessary
employee contact with commerce may be established by having
243. Robertson v. Dailey Elec. Supply Co., 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 734 (N.D. Tex. 1974).
244. 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
245. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, (Apr. 8, 1974).
246. The amendment of course has prospective application only. Coverage questions up
to the effective date of May 1, 1974 will be governed by the 1966 language. As there is a two
year statute of limitation for non-willful violations of the Act (three years for willful viola-
tions), Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, § 6(a), 29 U.S.C. § 255(a) (1970), the unamended lan-
guage will have importance until April 30, 1977.
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employees covered by the two traditional concepts of "engaged in
commerce" or "production of goods for commerce." Thus, all of the
post-1938 cases interpreting those two phrases still have vitality by
determining in large part whether the employee contact necessary
for enterprise coverage is present.
a. Handling goods that have been moved in commerce.-
"Engaged in commerce" is a species of term unto itself, and
"production of goods for commerce" looks to activities prelimi-
narily to goods entering commerce. The newer third basis of
contact complements the second by establishing a source of em-
ployee contact subsequent to the interstate movement of goods.
Thus, "handling goods or materials that have been moved in com-
merce" is a concept that clearly has an expansive impact upon the
class of employers covered by the Act, going well beyond the two
traditional coverage concepts. Nevertheless, in the landmark case
of Maryland v. Wirtz,'4 Mr. Justice Harlan created substantial con-
fusion as to the impact of the new phrase. The issue was the consti-
tutionality of the enterprise concept. Speaking for the Court, Harlan
stated: "Thus, the effect of the 1961 change was to extend protection
to fellow employees of any employee who would have been protected
by the original Act, but not to enlarge the class of employers subject
to the Act." ' 8 The majority was attempting.here to draw an analogy
to United States v. Darby,49 which had upheld the constitutionality
of traditional coverage, in order to support the constitutionality of
the amendments. The Court reasoned simply that since no new
employers were covered by the 1961 amendments, the issue of effect
on commerce was controlled by Darby. Nonetheless, employers
seized upon the "semi-dicta" quota above and argued that unless
they had two or more employees traditionally covered, theirs was
not an "enterprise engaged in commerce."
A few lower courts likewise suggested that the "including han-
dling goods that have been moved in commerce" was merely an
"attempt to correct unartful draftsmanship." 5 ' This interpretation
appeared to have some logical support, since the use of the connect-
ing modifier "including" suggested an explanation rather than an
expansion of the previous phrases of "engaged in commerce" and
"production of goods for commerce."
247. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
248. Id. at 188.
249. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
250. Shultz v. Travis Edwards, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 834, 838 (W.D. La. 1970), rev'd on
other grounds, sub nom. Hodgon v. Travis Edwards, Inc., 465 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
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Nevertheless, arguments that Congress had indeed expanded
the class of employers subject to the Act were .quite persuasive.
First, it must be assumed that Congress would not engage in a futile
act, and that statutory language should not be construed as mere
surplusage.51 "Engaged in commerce" and "production of goods for
commerce" had been in the Act since 1938, and had well estab-
lished, if not perfectly clear, meanings. When Congress desired to
clarify or alter some aspect of traditional coverage, as it did in 1949,
it did not hesitate to make its intention quite clear. However, in the
1961 and 1966 amendments there is not a single word from the
sponsors, or any one else, that the phrase "handling goods that have
been moved in commerce" means other than what it clearly says.
Furthermore, the Jacksonville Paper252 case was well known
when the 1961 and 1966 amendments were enacted. For nearly
twenty years it had been established that employees who handle
goods after they had "come to rest" locally were neither "engaged
in commerce" nor in the "production of goods for commerce." Con-
gress was aware of this doctrine,23 and therefore, when a classifica-
tion of employees who handle "goods that have been moved in com-
merce" was added, it must have been the deliberate desire of Con-
gress that this "come to rest" limitation upon traditional coverage
should not impose a similar limitation on the newly created enter-
prise concept. This "expanded" coverage was vigorously attacked
by the critics of the amendments,254 and comments of the sponsors
indicate that they too realized the import of this language.255
From the earliest decisions construing this term until the pres-
ent time the vast majority of the courts have agreed that Mr. Justice
Harlan was wrong. The impact of the phrase is perhaps best stated
by the leading Second Circuit case of Wirtz v. Melos Construction
Corp.56 There, construction employees handled building supplies
that had been purchased locally. In holding this to be sufficient to
establish coverage, the court stated:
[The 1961 amendments expanded coverage under the Act in two particulars.
First, it brought within the Act's coverage all employees of an enterprise if
some of its employees 'engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
commerce' . . . Second, the Section defined 'enterprise engaged in commerce
251. McDonald v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 263, 266 (1938); Platt v. Union Pac. R.R., 99
U.S. 48, 58-59 (1878); 2 J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 4705 (3d ed. 1943).
252. Walling v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 317 U.S. 564 (1943).
253. S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145, at 94-100; 107 CONG. REc. 5840-41 (1961).
254. H.R. REP. No. 75, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 (1961); S. REP. No. 145, supra note 145,
at 94-100; 106 CONG. REc. 5964 (1961); 107 CONG. REc. 4630-31 (1961); 107 CoNG. REc. 5964-
65 (1961).
255. 107 CONG. REC.,5840-41, 6236 (1961).
256. 408 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1969).
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. . .' to include an enterprise having employees engaged in 'handling, selling,
or otherwise working on goods that have been moved in or produced for com-
merce.'
. . . Melos' operation, like many other operations which were formerly not
covered by the Act, was brought under it by the extension of coverage. .... 5
This rationale has been uniformly followed by the courts of
appeals.28 In recent months the Supreme Court had two opportuni-
ties before it to address this unusual situation of uniform lower court
disagreement with a statement in a majority opinion of the Court.
In each case (Arnheim & Neely 9 and Falk211) the Court expressly
avoided overturning what was by 1974, the well established import
of the phrase. "Handling goods that have been moved in commerce"
expanded employer coverage by adding a new, third basis to tradi-
tional employee contact.
Any ambiguity that may have remained was resolved by Con-
gress in the 1974 amendments by deleting the confusing modifier
"including" and substituting the disjunctive term "or. '2 ' Conse-
quently it is now quite clear that "handling goods that have been
moved in commerce" does not in some way define the preceding
clauses of traditional coverage. Instead, the disjunctive "or" makes
"handling goods that have been moved in commerce" a basis for
enterprise coverage of independent dignity with "engaged in com-
merce" and "production of goods for commerce.
b. Goods or Materials.-(1) Consumed consumables.-
Having lost the main argument that the enterprise amendments
of 1961 and 1966 introduced no new employers to the Act's cover-
age, many employers, particularly in service industries, retreated
behind a second line of defense, one decidedly more complex,
but meeting with some degree of initial success in the lower
federal courts. The argument was this: In order to establish enter-
257. Id. at 627-28.
258. Brennan v. Iowa, 494 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1974) petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W.
3611 (U.S. Apr. 19, 1974) (No. 73-1565); Brennan v. Greene's Propane Gas Serv., Inc., 479
F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1973); Brennan v. Dillion, 483 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir. 1973); Shultz v. Falk,
439 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds sub noma. Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S.
190 (1973); National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); Shultz v. Kip's Big Boy, Inc., 431 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1970); Shultz v. Union Trust
Bank, 297 F. Supp. 1274 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Childress v. Earl Whitley, Enterprises, Inc., 388
F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1968); Shultz v. Deane-Hill Country Club, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 272 (E.D.
Tenn. 1969), aff'd, 433 F.2d 1311 (6th Cir. 1970); Wirtz v. Mayer Constr. Co., 291 F. Supp.
514 (D.N.J. 1968).
259. Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512 (1973).
260. Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190 (1973).
261. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(5)(A) (Apr. 8, 1974); S. RE. No. 690, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess. 17 (1974). Note also that until April 30, 1974, when the statute of limitations will toll
all actions arising prior to the amendment, the 1966 language will still have applications. See
Wirtz v. Savannah Bank & Trust Co., 362 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1966).
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prise coverage prior to 1974, the employees must have handled
"goods" that had been moved in commerce. The section 3(i) defini-
tion of "goods," however, "does not include goods after their deliv-
ery into the actual physical possession of the ultimate consumer
thereof other than a producer, manufacturer, or processor
thereof." "' Thus, argued the employer, if the employees are han-
dling only such items as soaps, toilet paper, waxes, light bulbs, and
similar custodial and maintenance supplies that are utilized on the
premises of the employer himself, these objects are in the hands of
the "ultimate consumer thereof," and "goods" in the hands of the
''ultimate consumer" are not "goods" within the definition of the
Act.
It is to this argument that the second apparently insignificant
1974 amendment was addressed. The term "goods" is no longer the
sole frame of reference to employee handling. The word "materials"
was added and this term is not burdened with an "ultimate con-
sumer" restriction. Some background will clarify the importance of
this single new word.
The ultimate consumer argument had no application to mer-
chandise situations in which goods were sold directly to third per-
sons, because such persons were clearly consumers beyond the em-
ployer. Likewise, the argument had little application to the con-
struction industry, since, although the building materials were con-
sumed in the construction of the building, the building itself was
passed on to others. 23 Even if the builder did not immediately plan
to resell the completed structure, working with the building materi-
als, changing their form and value, made the builder himself a
"producer," and the "ultimate consumer" proviso does not apply to
producers.26 Consequently, the "ultimate consumer" argument was
primarily applicable to hospitals, schools, real estate management
firms, laundries, and similar concerns-those areas where a service
was being supplied on particular premises and the employees
worked with consumable supplies consumed in providing the serv-
ice.
Three basic answers existed to the employer's argument that
"goods" are no longer "goods" when they are consumed in the hands
of these service employees. The first one, historical in origin, derives
from the fact that the section 3(i) definition of "good" was inserted
262. 29 U.S.C. § 203(i) (1970).
263. See Wirtz v. Melos Constr. Corp., 408 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1969); Wirtz v. Mayer
Constr. Co., 291 F. Supp. 514 (D.N.J. 1968).
264. See Wirtz v. Allen Green & Associates, 379 F.2d 198 (6th Cir. 1967).
265. 29 U.S.C. § 215(a) (1970).
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in the original Act in 1938, long before the enterprise concept was
conceived. The limitation as to "ultimate consumers" was a protec-
tion for ordinary consumers who might otherwise run afoul of the
"hot goods" '265 provisions of the Act. 6' It was unlikely that Congress
intended this "hot goods" protection for consumers to restrict the
scope of this newly conceived and expanded basis for coverage of the
Act. In fact the necessary contact with commerce for the industries
singled out by Congress for special coverage (hospitals, schools,
laundries, renting and leasing property"6 7) will in fact be their em-
ployees who handle maintenance supplies. Surely Congress would
not have intended to expand coverage to these industries while de-
nying it to many employers within these industries because of an
obscure restriction in another section of the previous Act. Further-
more, the definition of "goods" need not apply literally if the result
would have been to frustrate the manifest intent of Congress and the
purposes of the statute. A single term may have one definition in
one section of a statute, and be given an entirely different meaning
in another section. 268
The second major argument against the position that these
consumable articles are not "goods" is that the employer is not the
"ultimate consumer" of these items. It is the customer, not the
employer, that directly benefits from and utilizes the soaps, toilet
paper, waxes, and light bulbs. In each case the cost of these consum-
able items will be paid for by the customer through payment for the
total service rendered. A substantial portion of a tenant's rent goes
to pay for maintenance staff and the products they consume in
performing the service. The laundry fee relates directly to the cost
of soaps, bleach, and starch utilized in performing the service.
Therefore, it is difficult to argue that the business as an institution
consumes the items. The employer uses the goods to perform the
service, but the true enjoyment and consumption is with the benefi-
ciary of the service-the customer. The counter-argument states
that because the employer is not in fact the "ultimate consumer"
of these miscellaneous consumable items, they continue to be
"goods" when handled by the employees. If they have been "moved
266. 29 C.F.R. § 776.20(d) (1974); see Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S.
497, 512-15 (1950).
267. See S. REP. No. 1487, supra note 165, at 7-8.
268. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1964). In this
case the court was required to interpret the term "discipline" appearing in two different
sections of the Landrum-Griffin Act [29 U.S.C. § 401 (1970)]. The court indicated that
removal of a union official from union office was not "discipline" when used in the context
of whether a due process hearing was required before removal. Removal from office, however,
was "discipline" when used in the context of the official's protection of free speech within
the union. See also 2 J. SUTHRAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§ 4704, 4814 (3d ed. 1943).
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in commerce" the necessary employee nexus with commerce will be
established.
The third and final argument made by the Secretary is that the
employer who handles these consumable items in order to perform
his service technically is also a "producer" of these goods. These
items are "handled" and "worked on" by the employees, their form
being changed for the benefit of the customer, who pays for the item
in its modified form. The Secretary argues that this falls within the
Act's definition of "produced," '69 and thus the "ultimate consumer"
exclusion is inapplicable.
Initially, the courts were divided with a number accepting the
argument that it was the employer who was the "ultimate con-
sumer" of these items .270 On the other hand, the Fourth Circuit27'
and the District of Columbia Court of Appeals2 2 strongly intimated
that the Secretary's position was correct and that the service em-
ployer was not protected by the "ultimate consumer" proviso. On
at least two occasions, the Fifth Circuit avoided the issue by dispos-
ing of lower court holdings on alternative grounds.273 The only court
of appeals to resolve the issue unambigously was the Tenth Circuit
in Brennan v. Dillion.24 In Dillion a real estate management firm
had maintenance employees handling soaps, waxes, toilet paper,
and similar consumables. The tenant of the institution, rather than
the employer, was held to be the ultimate consumer of the items
even though they were consumed during the course of the employ-
ees' work.
A similar analysis was followed, although as an alternative
ground, by the Eighth Circuit in Brennan v. Iowa.2 15 There, hospital
employees who handled maintenance supplies were considered to
269. 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1970).
270. See, e.g., Brennan v. Jaffey, 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 971 (D. Del. 1974); Brennan v.
Apartment Communities Corp., 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 225 (D. Del. 1973); Shultz v. Travis
Edwards, Inc., 320 F. Supp. 834 (W.D. La. 1970), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Hodgson
v. Travis Edwards, Inc., 465 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Shultz
v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 320 F. Supp. 664 (S.D. Tex. 1970), afj'd on other grounds sub nom.
Brennan v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 855 (1973);
Shultz v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 324 & Neely, INc., 324 F. Supp. 987 (W.D. Pa. 1969), rev'd
on other grounds sub nor. Hodgson v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 444 F.2d 609 (3rd Cir. 1971),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brennan v. Arnheim & Neely, Inc., 410 U.S. 512 (1973).
271. See Shultz v. Falk, 439 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1971), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190 (1973).
272. See National Automatic Laundry & Cleaning Council v. Shultz, 443 F.2d 689 (D.C.
Cir. 1971).
273. See Brennan v. Wilson Bldg., Inc., 478 F.2d 1090 (5th Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. Travis
Edwards, Inc., 465 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1972).
274. 483 F.2d 1334 (10th Cir. 1973).
275. 494 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 42 U.S.L.W. 3611 (U.S. Apr.
19, 1974) (No. 73-1565).
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have sufficient contact with commerce to establish coverage, since
the hospital was not deemed to be the ultimate consumer of these
supplies. Thus the emerging majority of the district courts appears
to be in accord with a clear holding in the Tenth and dicta in the
Fourth, Eighth and the District of Columbia circuits. 276
Thus, on the eve of the passage of the 1974 Amendments it was
relatively well established that the phrase "including goods that
have been moved in commerce" expanded coverage by establishing
a new class of employee contact with commerce. Secondly, the term
"goods" was not being unduly restricted by the "ultimate con-
sumer" proviso. Consumable items utilized in the performance of
services were not deemed by most courts to be within the meaning
of the proviso. Nevertheless, the 1974 amendments removed all
doubt as to both issues. Replacing "including" with "or" clearly
indicated the expansive intent of the phrase "have been moved in
commerce. 277 Secondly, the additionof the word "materials" clearly
indicated that coverage was not to be restricted by the "ultimate
consumer" restriction on the definition of "goods." "Materials" is
not defined in the Act and thus its literal meaning is not restricted.
Consequently, the employee who handles soaps, light bulbs, toilet
paper, and other maintenance and custodial supplies is clearly han-
dling unadorned and unmodified "materials that have been moved
in commerce."27
2. Capital items-Are they goods or materials?-A question
now presented is whether the counter-arguments discussed above
concerning the applicability of the "ultimate consumer" exception
276. See United States v. Doochin, 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 743 (M.D. Tenn. 1974);
Hodgson v. Rivermont Corp., 21 Wage & Hour Cas. 171 (M.D. Fla. 1973); Hodgson v. Keller,
20 Wage & Hour Cas. 1093 (N.D. Ohio 1973); Sharp v. Warner Holding Co., 21 Wage & Hour
Cas. 206 (D. Minn. 1972); Mansdorf v. Ernest Tew & Associates, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 956
(M.D. Fla. 1972); Shultz v. Union Trust Bank, 297 F. Supp. 1274 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Wirtz v.
Washeterias, 304 F. Supp. 624 (D.C.Z. 1968).
277. See Hodgson v. Keller, 20 Wage & Hour Cas. 1093 (N.D. Ohio 1973); S. REP. No.
690, supra note 248, at 17.
278. Recently the District Court in Delaware refused to retreat from its earlier position
that soaps, bulbs, toilet paper and other consumables used by maintenance employees were
in the hands of the "ultimate consumer" and thus not "goods" within the meaning of the
Act. In so doing the court recognized that Congress added the word "materials" in 1974
specifically to insure coverage to employees like the ones before the court. It also acknowl-
edged that Congress had stated in the history of the 1974 amendments that it had intended
in 1961 and 1966 to reach these same employees, and that the cases to the contrary had
wrongly interpreted the will of Congress. It was to correct any lingering misimpressions that
the additions were made. Nonetheless, this court refused to retreat, insisting that these items
were not "goods" under the 1961 and 1966 provisions, and Congress' retroactive interpretation
of its intent was not binding. Only upon the effective date of the 1974 amendments would
"handling" of these "materials" establish coverage. Brennan v. Jaffey, 21 Wage & Hour Cas.
971 (D. Del. 1974).
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to consumable supplies dictate an interpretation of the term that
includes capital goods. For example, one can imagine a business-
man employing a secretary and a delivery boy-a situation so purely
"local" that Congress had indicated no desire to regulate his wage-
hour practices 2 9 Although he receives no consumables that have
ever been in commerce (or if he does, he handles them himself
exclusively), and performs no services or ships no goods across state
lines, his secretary utilizes a ten year old typewriter sitting on a
twenty year old desk, both of which were manufactured out of state.
Furthermore, his delivery boy rides a three year old Sears-Roebuck
bicycle. If these capital items are considered "goods or materials,"
this would seem to be sufficient employee contact with commerce
to establish that element of coverage.
In defining "goods," the Act itself speaks in terms of "articles
of commerce," neither excluding nor including capital non-
consumables that an employer purchases for long term use in his
business. On its face, however, the definition is certainly broad
enough to include capital goods. The new term "materials" is not
defined in the Act. In common usage, however, it has a more limited
definition than the term "goods. '280
Until 1970 the Secretary of Labor's interpretive bulletin ex-
cluded tools, capital equipment and similar non-consumables not
for shipment or resale from the definition of "goods. '2 ' In April
1970, the Secretary deleted this restriction 212 but did not state posi-
tively that capital equipment was now considered to be "goods."
Since that time, however, he has argued in court that employees
who handle such non-consumable items are handling "goods"
within the meaning of the Act. 283
In most cases the problem of whether an employer's capital
items are "goods" presents little problem. Most businesses of the
size necessary for coverage will have employees with a more direct
connection with commerce than merely handling equipment or sim-
ilar non-consumable items that are not for resale and are not them-
selves shipped by the employer. Nevertheless, there is the possibil-
ity of unique enterprises of 250,000 dollars operating "locally," and
of small schools or laundries (whose minimum dollar volume is not
279. See Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310 (1960); 10 E. 40th St. Bldg., Inc. v.
Callus, 325 U.S. 578 (1945); S. REP. No. 1487, supra note 165; S. REP. No. 145, supra note
145.
280. WEBSTER'S THm NEW INTERNATIONAL DICrIONARY 1392 (unabridged 1961) defines
"material" as "the basic matter (as metal, wood, plastic, fiber) from which the whole or the
greater part of something physical as a machine, tool, building, fabric is made. .. .
281. 29 C.F.R. § 779.240(a)(1969).
282. 35 Fed. Reg. 5872 (1970).
283. See Hodgson v. Travis Edwards, Inc., 465 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1972).
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material) that have supplies manufactured locally, and whose only
contact with commerce is through employees working with the
employer's capital goods.
From 1938 until 1961, by virtue of the Act's definition of
"goods," an employee was covered by his contact with "goods" only
if they were destined to enter the stream of commerce. Only with
the expansion of coverage to reach employers on the other end of the
flow of commerce, who have employees working with "goods that
have been moved in commerce," does a refined definition of the
term "goods" become necessary. Unfortunately, Congress has not
attempted any revision or redefinition of the 1938 definition of
"goods" since 1961, and thus there is no relevant legislative history
to provide insight into congressional thinking.
Because Congress in 1938 was clearly addressing itself to
"goods" that were to be shipped by the employer, that interpreta-
tion of the term should continue to be applied unless to do so would
frustrate the purposes of subsequent amendments. The concept of
shipping goods to others necessarily excludes the concept of non-
consumable capital items that are received for use in one's own
business with no intent to transfer these items to others.
This limited view of "goods" does not frustrate the purpose of
the 1961 and 1966 amendments. On the contrary, an interpretation
of "goods" that excludes capital non-consumables appears to be
consistent with the thrust of these amendments. If the contact with
capital goods is sufficient to establish coverage, employee contact
as a factor is rendered virtually meaningless. The nature of the
business (schools, hospitals, construction, laundries) or the requisite
dollar volume of sales would be the sole basis for determining cover-
age. While few employers may lack employees traditionally covered
or who handle consumables that "have been moved in commerce,"
clearly no employer lacks employees who walk on floors, work at
desks, operate machinery, or handle tools, many of which will have
been produced out of state. By necessity all employees either will
be themselves engaged in commerce, handle products for sale, uti-
lize consumable items, or work with capital goods. Furthermore, it
would be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between types
of capital goods so that some limiting factor could be devised. There
is probably no legal difference between a delivery boy's bicycle and
an operating engineer's bulldozer, among a hammer, a desk, and a
doorknob.
In making employee contact with commerce a factor for cover-
age, Congress could not have been engaging in a futile act by includ-
ing an all inclusive factor applying to every living person in society
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today. When Congress desired to cover a whole class of employees
without regard to contact with commerce it specifically did so, as
in its passage of the 1974 amendments extending coverage to domes-
tic employees on the basis of "affecting commerce." '84 Furthermore,
the courts have all assumed that employee contact with commerce
in some way limited the usual coverage of the Act. Assuming, then,
that Congress did not engage in a futile act, and did not desire to
utilize the nature or size of the business as the sole criterion for
establishing coverage, the definition of "goods" must be limited to
exclude capital non-consumables.
Secondly, in the example above of a "local" businessman with
a secretary working at a typewriter, and a delivery boy riding a
bicycle, one might argue that such business activity does not even
rise to the level of "affecting commerce" and thus Congress could
not constitutionally have legislated to regulate this conduct. 285 More
importantly, because Congress avowedly did not exercise all of its
constitutional power to regulate all that affected commerce, we
must assume that even if this small local employer "affected com-
merce," Congress stopped short of regulating his wage-hour policies.
The Supreme Court has indicated more than once that Congress
desired to reserve an area of local concern for local regulation.
26
Even if all observers agree that "goods" cannot be interpreted
to include capital goods, the question remains as to how this can be
done consistently with the broad definition of "goods" in the Act.
First, upon looking to the historical context and intent of the Act,
it is clear that Congress in 1938 had no idea of "goods" including
capital items that were not being shipped by the employer. Nothing
in the1961, 1966 or 1974 amendments requires an alteration of that
view. In fact, as pointed out, to alter and expand the idea of "goods"
to cover capital items renders meaningless the supposed limiting
factor of employee contact.
Secondly, the "ultimate consumer" proviso can be dusted off
and applied to capital items. The courts' conclusion that this prov-
iso is inapplicable to consumable items utilized by the employer in
providing services to customers does not preclude a distinction be-
284. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 7(a) (Apr. 8, 1974).
285. Congress obviously believes it has the power to regulate such purely "local" con-
duct if it desires. This is evidenced by the 1974 amendments in which Congress found that
domestic service affects commerce, and proceeded to apply the minimum wage protection to
domestic service and baby sitters. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 7(a) (Apr. 8, 1974). See Daniel v.
Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942), in which extremely tenuous contact with commerce was held to support
the congressional regulation.
286. See cases and materials cited note 279 supra.
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tween consumable and non-consumable items. The fruits and bene-
fits of the consumable items are more or less directly passed on to
the consumer who pays the employer directly for these goods."8 7
With respect to capital items, however, the employer is more truly
the consumer. Although the furnishing of goods and services ulti-
mately depends upon capital, and payment to the employer is in
part allocated to the amortization of capital expenditures, the
connection between the good or service provided and capital is more
attenuated than it is between a service and a consumable item
directly necessary for its performance. Furthermore, if the "ulti-
mate consumer" proviso is to have any current coverage meaning,
such meaning must derive from its application to the employer's
capital goods. Therefore, when the employer purchases capital
items handled by his employees, the capital item is now in the
hands of the "ultimate consumer" thereof, and thus can no longer
be considered "goods" within the meaning of the Act.
This analysis, however, does not dispose of the new term "ma-
terials," which is not graced by an "ultimate consumer" proviso.
Regardless of the limitation that can be placed on the term "goods,"
unless capital goods are not "materials" then coverage still will be
established by the existence of employees handling tools, equipment
and similar items. As previously mentioned, the term "materials"
has a relatively limited definition,18 relating more to components or
ingredients of a product or service and suggesting a unit of a larger
element. The dictionary definition expressly distinguishes "mate-
rial" from capital items. In short, it is hard to think of a desk, a
bicycle, or a bulldozer being a "material." Furthermore, there is no
indication that the 1974 Congress intended to give it a more ex-
panded meaning,8 9 since the word was added to remove any ambi-
guity surrounding the term "goods" and its application to consuma-
ble items utilized in the performance of a service. That limited
intent should be honored.
To summarize briefly, by 1974 the term "goods," after some
contrary authority, was being applied to consumable supplies uti-
lized by service employers, and "ultimate consumer" proviso was
not being utilized to exclude these supply items. The courts viewed
the customer rather than the employer as the ultimate consumer of
these supplies. Ultimately, any lingering confusion concerning the
287. See Goldberg v. Furman Beauty Supply, Inc., 300 F.2d 16 (3rd Cir. 1962), where,
interpreting the retail exemption of § 13(a)(2) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(2) (1970)), the
court believed that lotions and shampoos placed on the hair of customers were being "resold"
to the patron of the beauty parlor.
288. See material cited note 280 supra.
289. See S. REP. No. 690, supra note 261.
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application of "goods" to these items was rendered moot by the
addition of the term "materials," a term that was not encumbered
by any ultimate consumer caveat. Although there is no direct au-
thority on point, it would appear, however, that the "ultimate con-
sumer" proviso would be applicable to capital items utilized by the
employer in the production of goods or services. Unlike consum-
ables, capital items at rest and at use on the premises of the em-
ployer are in the hands of the "ultimate consumer" and conse-
quently are not "goods." The 1974 term "materials" is so limited
in its scope and purpose that it likewise would not appear applicable
to capital items. This amendment appears not to have expanded
"goods" beyond making it clear that consumable items utilized by
service employees would serve as a basis for coverage.
IV. CONCLUSION
Unlike sister statutes of special reform, where litigation over
coverage has been rare, the history of the FLSA has been a battle
over the fundamental question of coverage. The term "affecting
commerce" has determined the application of most statutes, and
has long since been resolved on constitutional grounds. Congress,
however, did not use those magic words when it first passed and
then amended the FLSA. As it existed from 1938 through 1961,
the Act looked solely to employee contact with commerce through
their "engaging in commerce" or "production of goods for com-
merce"-two complicated terms of art. In 1961 Congress added, for
the first time, the extremely complicated concept of "enterprise
coverage." With subsequent amendments in 1966 the concept was
refined and the required dollar volume of "sales made or business
done" was reduced to 250,000 dollars. Furthermore, the 1974
amendments gave coverage to domestic servants, public employees,
and removed any lingering ambiguity as to necessary employee con-
tact with materials that had "come to rest."
The result has been that because of the expansive interpreta-
tions of traditional phrases "engaged in commerce" or "production
of goods for commerce" many employees of some small or "local"
businessmen are covered by the Act. Because of the lower dollar
volume, already depreciated by inflation, and the minimal em-
ployee contact with commerce, all but a few small pockets of
enterprises are covered. Yet, the complicated, esoteric coverage pro-
visions remain. Congress should recognize this reality. As it exists
now coverage generally meets, seldom falls below, and perhaps is
asserted occasionally beyond the congressional power to regulate
that which "affects commerce." The Act should be amended to wipe
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away this confusion by covering all employers "affecting com-
merce." Should Congress desire to exempt certain employers be-
cause of their businesses or even their size, this can be accomplished
more easily through exceptions than by the complicated concepts of
"engaged in commerce," "production of goods for commerce," and
"enterprise engaged in commerce." These archaic problems of inter-
pretation provide little substance, many traps to understanding,
and much litigation. They should be removed.

